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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Section I: Motivating Questions 
 Should the state intervene in the bargains struck between employers and employees, using 
the law to regulate working conditions and mandate or prohibit certain terms of employment? The 
short, obvious answer is, “Yes.” You currently either believe or should believe that the state should 
prohibit slavery. Therefore, you cannot (or at least, should not) consistently hold that the state must 
never intervene in matters involving employers and employees. You might also believe that the state 
should prohibit indentured servitude, child labor, prostitution, or other sorts of work, in which case 
you could believe that there are other “easy answers” to this question. However, most of the 
questions in this neighborhood tend to be contested and difficult to resolve, and in this dissertation, 
I hope to contribute to our ongoing attempts to achieve resolution of work-related issues by 
offering a perspective that frames work more as an important relationship between parties rather 
than as an impersonal contract. 
 The more difficult questions in this area include both broad questions, such as those 
concerning the extent of normatively required or permissible state intervention and what must be 
considered in justifications of interventions, and narrow ones, such as those concerning specific 
proposed laws, regulations, or policies. My research is largely focused on the former, broader sorts 
of questions, but I hope that my answers to these questions will imply answers to the more specific 
ones, or at least provide helpful perspectives from which to consider them.   
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 When questions concerning state intervention and its justification arise, we are often 
encouraged to frame the debates as a struggle or balancing act between two extremes: paternalism 
and liberty of contract. Any adequate discussion of the normative requirements of work law must 
consider the common criticism that minimum-wage, maximum-hour, and workplace-safety laws 
constitute nothing more than paternalistic and unjust constraints on individuals’ freedom of 
contract. Proponents of this critique typically appeal to a robust conception of liberty, which implies 
that competent adults should be free to enter contracts without restriction. Moreover, critics argue 
that attempts to justify state intervention by reference to citizens’ best interests constitute 
unacceptable paternalism because they assume that competent adults are not capable of making 
rational decisions for themselves.  
However, framing the debate in this way oversimplifies and obscures it, and my project in 
this dissertation is to challenge, in three distinct ways, the popular but misguided view that so long as 
workers are permitted to make their own free choices regarding what work to accept, the law need 
not – and according to some, should not – “protect” them from certain types of employment 
contracts.    
 
Section II: Summary of Substantive Chapters 
My dissertation comprises the following three inter-related Chapters, all of which explore the 
nature and purpose of work law and critically analyze the prevalent emphasis on matters of contract 
in discussions of work law: 
 
Chapter Two: The Escape Plans of Mill and Jefferson  
I discuss herein the similar “escape plans” proposed by John Stuart Mill and Thomas 
Jefferson as legal interventions to minimize the need for wage work. Mill predicted and advocated 
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the adoption of cooperative, worker-owned and -managed firms, while Jefferson proposed 
abandoning wage labor in favor of claiming and farming on the vast American frontier. Neither 
theorist’s prediction was realized. I explore the normative question whether either plan could have 
satisfied the demands of justice. I first describe these thinkers’ respective proposals and their 
supporting arguments, and then discuss what was problematic about them. Finally, I argue that the 
most serious normative problem with such proposals arises when other theorists mistakenly assume 
that so long as the law provides alternatives to wage labor, it can justly leave wage labor relationships 
in an unregulated, Dickensian state.  In reply, I contend that we have no just alternative to engaging 
in the messy and difficult task of regulating the workplace.   
 
Chapter Three: Revising the Roles of Master and Servant  
In this Chapter, I critically examine the claim that work law is best conceived as part of 
contract law, arguing that it is neither descriptively nor normatively instructive. Rather than 
understanding work law as a set of restraints on freedom of contract, we should see it as creating 
and defining special relationships, much like the codified definitions of marriages and business 
partnerships. I trace the development of work relationships through the common law of “master 
and servant” and their more recent statutory modification. I argue that the history and present form 
of work law are not consistent with the contract-centered view of work law as “interfering” with an 
otherwise free labor market. In addition, I set the stage for a future research project in which I will 
advance the positive argument that since work relationships permit employers’ exercising authority 
over workers, a just body of work law should permit only legitimate exercises of authority while 
minimizing overreaching by employers.  
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Chapter Four: Competing Ideologies and the End of the Lochner Era   
This Chapter further explores the ideology underlying the “contract law” view I criticize in 
the first two Chapters. I examine Howard Gillman’s critique of the received view that Supreme 
Court Justices in the early 20th Century (aka the “Lochner era” after Lochner v. New York, a 1905 case 
striking down a law setting maximum working hours for bakers on the grounds that it violated 
“liberty of contract”) decided cases based on policy preferences rather than principled legal 
interpretation. Gilman challenges this “attitudinal” account of the Lochner era by reconstructing a 
principled legal ideology to which the Justices could have been committed. Gilman thus undermines 
the argument that Lochner-era justices had no principled legal basis for their decisions and therefore 
must have been deciding cases according to their laissez faire policy preferences. However, Gilman 
further claims that the Justices who dissented in Lochner and eventually overruled the “liberty of 
contract” regime in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), had no principled basis for their 
decisions and therefore must have decided cases according to their policy preferences. In response, I 
defend the West Coast Hotel opinion by reconstructing the principled legal ideology to which the 
justices who struggled against and ultimately defeated the Lochner era’s “liberty of contract” regime 
were committed. In addition, I sketch a normative argument to the effect that West Coast Hotel was 
not only based on a plausible interpretation of early-20th Century constitutional law, but also 
constituted the best possible move – with respect to justice, at least, and perhaps also, derivatively, 
with respect to the law – for the Court to make at that point in its history. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE ESCAPE PLANS OF MILL AND JEFFERSON: 
WHY THE LAW MUST DO MORE FOR WORKERS 
 
Section I. Introduction 
In a particularly ambitious chapter of his seminal Principles of Political Economy, titled “On the 
Probable Futurity of the Labouring Classes,”1 John Stuart Mill predicts that in the foreseeable future 
wage workers would – and importantly, should – be increasingly likely to join together in 
cooperative firms in order to escape oppressive wage-labor relationships.  Mill also argues that the 
move to cooperative firms would provide substantial benefits to the cooperating worker-managers 
themselves,2 as well as to society as a whole.3 However, Mill’s prediction seems to have been 
dismally inaccurate, and in a recent paper, Prof. Justin Schwartz explores the interesting and 
important question why Mill turned out to be so wrong on this point.4 In his paper, Schwartz 
                                                          
1  JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH SOME OF THEIR APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL 
PHILOSOPHY 752 (W.J. Ashley ed., Longmans, Green & Co. new ed. 1909, reprt. 1915) (1848). 
2 Id. at 789 (“From the progressive advance of the co-operative movement, a great increase may be looked for . . 
. . In the first place, the class of mere distributors, who are not producers but auxiliaries of production, . . . will be 
reduced to more modest dimensions”). 
 
3 Id. at 789-90 (“It is scarcely possible to rate too highly this material benefit, which yet is as nothing to 
compared with the moral revolution in society that would accompany it: the healing of the standing feud between capital 
and labour; the transformation of human life, from a conflict of classes struggling for opposite interests, to a friendly 
rivalry in pursuit of a good common to all; the elevation of the dignity of labour; a new sense of security and 
independence in the labouring class; and the conversion of each human being’s daily occupation into a school of the 
social sympathies and the practical intelligence”). 
 
4 Justin Schwartz, Where Did Mill Go Wrong?: Why the Capital-Managed Firm Rather than the Labor-Managed Enterprise 
Is the Predominant Organizational Form in Market Economies, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 219 (2012); see also Justin Schwartz, Voice 
Without Say: Why More Capitalist Firms Are Not (Genuinely) Participatory, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 963, 967 (2013)  
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examines the explanations offered by three leading analysts of worker cooperatives – namely N. 
Scott Arnold, Henry Hansmann, and Gregory Dow – argues that each analyst’s account is 
problematic in one or more respects, and then presents his own proposed explanation for 
cooperative firms’ failure to thrive to anywhere near the extent that Mill predicted they would.5   
Prof. Schwartz’s discussion of Mill’s unrealized prediction for workers’ “futurity” is clearly a valuable 
contribution, but my focus differs from that of Prof. Schwartz, who concentrates on Mill’s prediction 
and the reasons for its inaccuracy.  I propose, instead, to engage in a critical evaluation of the 
normative merits of Mill’s prescription for workers. That is, Mill not only predicted that workers 
would be likely to form cooperatives but also argued that workers had at least a prudential – and 
perhaps also a moral or aesthetic6 – duty to eschew wage labor in favor of realizing their productive 
energies through worker-managed cooperative firms.   
Moreover, as one reads Mill’s discussion it becomes clear that he believes that once a given 
society’s legal system creates and maintains the institutions and laws necessary to permit the 
formation of such cooperative firms, it has done all for workers that justice requires.  In other 
words, Mill holds that once the law offers workers an alternative to – i.e., an “escape” or “exit 
option” from – the indignity and poverty of wage labor, this will satisfy the law’s duty of justice to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(exploring the related questions “[w]hy have the few capitalist firms that do give workers real say not become, through 
competition and imitation[,] the prevalent organizational form? Why does authoritarian hierarchy persist as the main 
form of enterprise organization even in firms with some form of employee participation?”) (citing Armen E. Alchian, 
Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211 (1950) reprinted in ARMEN ALCHIAN, ECONOMIC FORCES 
AT WORK 15, 25, 28-30 (1977). 
 
5  Schwartz, Where Did Mill Go Wrong?: Why the Capital-Managed Firm Rather than the Labor-Managed Enterprise Is the 
Predominant Organizational Form in Market Economies, supra note 4 219, at 223-24 (citing, inter alia, N. SCOTT ARNOLD, THE 
PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS OF MARKET SOCIALISM: A CRITICAL STUDY 1-49 (1994); N. Scott Arnold, Market 
Socialism, 6 CRITICAL REV. 517, 534-36 (1992); HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 89-98 (1996); 
GREGORY K. DOW, GOVERNING THE FIRM: WORKERS’ CONTROL IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 236-38 (2003)). 
 
6  Mill’s theories of the aesthetic virtues require a great deal of exegesis and are, in any case, beyond the scope of 
this paper. For my purposes, I will merely point out that it is widely acknowledged that Mill emphasized the importance 
of living a life of aesthetic as well as moral value much more than most other Utilitarians, especially his contemporaries.   
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alleviate the plight of workers.  This normative conclusion is, I will argue, a serious mistake that is 
regrettably common in social, political, and legal thinking.    
For example, it is interesting to compare Mill’s view to that of his near-contemporary 
Thomas Jefferson.  Like Mill, Jefferson was appalled by workers’ increasing reliance on wage labor, 
but Jefferson, like Mill, had an “escape plan” in mind for the laboring classes.7  Jefferson’s plan 
relied on the availability of land on the vast American frontier: he was confident that legal provisions 
providing for the prospect of staking valid claims on free plots of land offered workers an appealing 
alternative – indeed, all that justice required – to the wage labor that was becoming increasingly 
prevalent in the nascent U.S. industrial labor market.8  Jefferson, like Mill and many of their 19th 
century contemporaries, disapproved of wage labor on the grounds that it was a degrading way to 
earn a living, both for those who performed such labor and the society which relied upon it.9  
Jefferson’s position also resembles Mill’s in that he strongly believes that his favored alternative to 
wage labor – i.e., staking a claim on the frontier and working the land – would both further the 
interests of workers and contribute to the moral quality of the nation.10   
Sadly, neither theorist’s prescription truly panned out, and to this day, the dominant form of 
work in England, the U.S., and other Western democracies continues to be the sort of wage labor 
                                                          
7  However, he was probably unlike Mill in being relatively unconcerned about the plight of the wageworkers 
themselves, since his primary focus was on what was good or bad for the nation as a whole.   
 
8  See, e.g., THOMAS JEFFERSON, 4 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 84 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., G.P. 
Putnam’s Sons 1904) (1782). 
 
9  Id. at 86 (“[L]et our work-shops remain in Europe. It is better to carry provisions and materials to work-men 
there, than bring them [here], and with them their manners and principles. The loss by the transportation of 
commodities across the Atlantic will be made up in happiness and permanence of government. The mobs of great cities 
add just so much to the support of pure government, as sores do to the strength of the human body.”). 
 
10  Id. at 85-86 (“Those who labour in the earth are the chosen people of God, … whose breasts he has made his 
peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine virtue. It is the focus in which he keeps alive that sacred fire, which 
otherwise might escape from the face of the earth. Corruption of morals in the mass of cultivators is a phaenomenon of 
which no age nor nation has furnished an example. . . . [G]enerally speaking the proportion which the aggregate of the 
other classes of citizens bears in any state to that of its husbandmen, is the proportion of its unsound to its healthy parts, 
and is a good enough barometer whereby to measure its degree of corruption.”). 
8 
 
that both Mill and Jefferson abhorred.  In Parts II and III of this paper, I will describe these 
thinkers’ respective proposals and their arguments in support of their desirability.  In Part IV I will 
aim to identify what is problematic about these two thinkers’ similar prescribed solutions to the 
problems associated with the move to an industrial wage-labor economy in the 19th century.  Finally, 
in Parts V and VI, I will argue that the most serious normative problem with the sort of approach 
favored by Mill and Jefferson is that it mistakenly assumes that so long as the law provides an 
alternative to wage labor, it can then justly leave wage labor relationships in an unregulated, 
Dickensian state.  In other words, I contend that even if either Mill’s or Jefferson’s prediction had 
been more accurate, we should not follow their reasoning and conclude that the law would have 
therefore done all for workers that justice requires.  Instead, we must eschew the tempting thought 
that policymakers need not engage in the messy and difficult task of regulating the workplace.  No 
alternative “escape” from wage labor that the law could create, facilitate, or encourage would make it 
just to relegate wage laborers to a laisser-faire, unregulated “race to the bottom.”         
 
Section II. Mill on the “Co-operative Principle” 
A. Mill’s Arguments for Cooperative Firms 
In Book IV, Chapter I, of his Principles of Political Economy,11 Mill argues that the essential 
distinction between the “civilized” and the “savage” person is the former’s superior “capacity for co-
operation.”12  Mill explains that although humans in a “rude state of society” possess many adaptive 
abilities that more civilized humans lack, they are not so capable of seeing the advantages of long-
term planning and engaging in cooperative endeavors.13  In the same passage, Mill suggests that the 
                                                          
11  MILL, supra note 1, at 695. (Book IV is titled Influence of the Progress of Society on Production and Distribution, and 
Chapter I bears the title General Characteristics of a Progressive State of Wealth).   
 
12  Id. at 698. 
   
13  Id. at 698-99. 
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possibility for cooperation offers the best hope for progress and improvement in modern industrial 
societies.   
In Chapter VII of Book IV,14 Mill advances a compelling discussion of what would and 
should happen in the future of work relations – titled “On the Probable Futurity of the Labouring 
Classes” – in which he predicts, firstly, that workers’ increasing access to the franchise, education, 
and the freedom to choose how they will arrange their working lives will eventually lead to a 
proliferation of worker-owned and -managed cooperative firms.15   
In this chapter, although Mill initially appears principally concerned with predicting the 
probable nature of future working relationships, it becomes clear that he also strongly prescribes and 
endorses the move toward the predominance of this form of cooperative association, which he argues 
would be in the best interests of workers and society as a whole.  Mill offers three main arguments in 
support of this prescription. 
First, Mill argues that the standard model of industrial production, in which capitalists 
employ wage laborers, is damaging to the interests and character of both the employers and the 
workers they employ.  Mill begins by noting the widespread agreement that “the state of the 
labouring people” was not “what it ought to be,” and then describes two opposing theories one 
might entertain as to the best means to address this problem.  The first of these he calls the theory 
of “dependence and protection” – i.e., the paternalistic view that the poor should be dependent on 
the rich, who would willingly and charitably offer their “protection” – and he refers to the second, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
14  Id. at 752. 
 
15  Id. at 772-73 (“The form of association, however, which if mankind continue to improve, must be expected in 
the end to predominate, is not that which can exist between a capitalist as chief, and workpeople without a voice in the 
management, but the association of the labourers themselves on terms of equality, collectively owning the capital with 
which they carry on their operations, and working under managers elected and removable by themselves.”). 
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opposed theory as that of “self-dependence,” according to which the poor would become 
increasingly reliant on their own efforts and capabilities to attain better lives for themselves.16   
Although Mill recognizes the appeal – to the rich, at least – of the idealistic notion that the 
wealthy and powerful would gladly and reliably provide the sort of guidance and protection for the 
laboring classes envisioned by the theory of dependence and protection, he rejects this notion as an 
obvious fantasy, asserting that “[a]ll privileged and powerful classes, as such, have used their power 
in the interest of their own selfishness, and have indulged their self-importance in despising, and not 
in lovingly caring for, those who were, in their estimation, degraded, by being under the necessity of 
working for their benefit.”17   
From Mill’s derisive tone throughout this discussion, we can reasonably infer that he agrees 
that the laboring classes are thusly “degraded” by their dependence upon the wealthier classes.  
However, he emphatically denies the possibility of improving the lot of the working poor by an 
increased emphasis on protection by the rich.  Moreover, Mill contends that whether or not the rich 
could be induced to act in the best interests of the poor, the ever-increasing access to education and 
expansion of political rights that is characteristic of progressive societies would bring about changes 
in the laboring classes which would lead them to reject any scheme of paternalistic “protection.”18   
                                                          
16  Id. at 753 (“According to the former theory, the lot of the poor, in all things which affect them collectively, 
should be regulated for them, not by them.  They should not be required or encouraged to think for themselves, or give 
to their own reflection or forecast an influential voice in the determination of their destiny. . . . The relation between rich 
and poor, according to this theory (a theory also applied to the relation between men and women) should be only partly 
authoritative; it should be amiable, moral, and sentimental: affectionate tutelage on the one side, respectful and grateful 
deference on the other.  The rich should be in loco parentis to the poor, guiding and restraining them like children.”). 
 
17  Id. at 754. 
 
18 Id. at 756 (“Of the working men . . . it may be pronounced certain, that the patriarchal or paternal system of 
government is one to which they will not again be subject. That question was decided, when they were taught to read, 
and allowed access to newspapers and political tracts; when dissenting preachers were suffered to go among them . . . ; 
when they were brought together in numbers, to work socially under the same roof; when railways enabled them to shift 
from place to place, and change their patrons and employers as easily as their coats; when they were encouraged to seek 
a share in the government, by means of the electoral franchise.  The working classes have taken their interests into their 
own hands, and are perpetually showing that they think the interests of their employers not identical to their own, but 
opposite to them.”). 
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Mill clearly approves of the increasing independence and autonomy of the laboring classes, but he 
does not blame all the ills of the wage-labor relationship on the employers.   
Instead, Mill holds that employer and worker are equally likely to behave inappropriately or 
inefficiently within traditional wage-labor relationships.  Mill seems to consider it unacceptably 
authoritarian for employers to dictate job requirements to their employees in minute detail, but he 
nonetheless assumes that most wage workers will not work without stern and constant supervision, 
since he holds that they are typically unwilling to do an honest day’s work for honest pay.19   
Although Mill recognizes that workers get much less out of the arrangement than do their 
employers, he also believes that the wage-labor relationship brings out the worst in both employer 
and employed.     
Second, Mill argues that the move to cooperative associations would lead to an improvement 
in productive efficiency.  However, he has a particular notion of “improvement” in mind, as he 
argues that to aim at “the mere increase of production” is to embrace a “false ideal of human 
society.”  Instead, a society should focus its efforts on realizing the two desiderata of “improved 
distribution, and a large remuneration of labour.”  In other words, once a society reaches a certain 
level of aggregate production, “neither the legislator nor the philanthropist need feel any strong 
interest” in further increases in production, “but, that it should increase relatively to the number of 
those who share in it, is of the utmost possible importance.”20  Accordingly, Mill’s conception of 
what is desirable for society seems to be motivated by some markedly egalitarian intuitions.   
Although he is interested in discovering the ways in which we, as a society, can be more 
productive, his main concern in this regard – at least, as evidenced in this chapter – is to ensure that 
                                                          
19  Id. at 761 (“The total absence of regard for justice or fairness in the relations between the two, is as marked on 
the side of the employed as on that of the employers.  We look in vain among the working classes in general for the just 
pride which will choose to give good work for good wages; for the most part, their sole endeavor is to receive as much, 
and return as little in the shape of service, as possible.”). 
 
20  Id. at 752.   
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whatever is produced can be shared by more and more members of society.  For example, Mill 
argues in support of the desirability of industrial production as follows: 
Labour is unquestionably more productive on the system of large industrial enterprises; the 
produce, if not greater absolutely, is greater in proportion to the labour employed: the same 
number of persons can be supported equally well with less toil and greater leisure; which will 
be wholly an advantage, as soon as civilization and improvement have so far advanced, that 
what is a benefit to the whole shall be a benefit to each individual composing it.21 
 
Although the advantages of industrial production can be partially realized in standard capitalist 
enterprises employing wage laborers, Mill argues that cooperative industrial firms would be even 
more productive.  Since workers in a cooperative enterprise would have a share in the profits and 
thus a direct interest in the firm’s success, they would be motivated to work more diligently and 
make their firms more productive.22 
This increased production would, in turn, result in improvements in Mill’s proposed 
desiderata of increased distribution of income and wealth throughout society and a large 
remuneration of labor, since workers in cooperative associations would share in their highly 
productive firms’ profits.  As I will discuss in Section IV, below, Mill’s confidence in this 
competitive advantage has proven to be largely misplaced, but his view was reasonable at the time, 
as he based it on some compelling contemporary examples of successful cooperative firms.23 
Third, Mill argues that the changes in society that would accompany the increasing 
predominance of cooperative firms – both those changes that make such cooperation possible and 
those brought about by the prevalence of cooperative associations – would be extremely beneficial 
for society as a whole.  Whereas wage labor tends to bring out the worst traits in both employers 
                                                          
21  Id. at 762.   
 
22  Id. at 789 (“The other mode in which co-operation tends, still more efficaciously, to increase the 
productiveness of labour, consists in the vast stimulus given to productive energies, by placing the labourers, as a mass, 
in a relation to their work which would make it their principle and their interest – at present it is neither – to do the 
utmost, instead of the least possible, in exchange for their remuneration.”).   
 
23  Id. at 765-72 (citations omitted). 
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and employed, cooperative associations would foster communal relations among all members of 
society.24 
Accordingly, Mill concludes that both capitalists and workers would benefit from the move 
to cooperative firms – or at least those in which workers have some share in the firm’s profits.  
More importantly, Mill forecasts even more significant moral and social improvements as a 
consequence of the widespread adoption of the cooperative principle.25   
 
B. Three Observations  
Mill’s optimistic forecast for the future of labor and society is appealing, and his arguments 
may well strike us as prima facie persuasive, but it would be worthwhile to clarify of what Mill does 
and does not aim to persuade us.  In particular, we should note that although Mill’s arguments for 
the social value of cooperative associations might seem to support the notion that society should only 
permit the incorporation of democratic workplaces – i.e., those in which workers have at least some 
influence over the management of the firm and/or share in the firm’s profits – this is clearly not 
what Mill has in mind.  Instead, Mill advocates competition between traditional capitalist firms and 
cooperative firms and predicts that the competitive advantage afforded by the diligence of workers 
                                                          
24  Id. at 762-63 (“[I]n the moral aspect of the question, which is still more important than the economical, 
something better should be aimed at as the goal of industrial improvement, than to disperse mankind over the earth in 
single families, each ruled internally, as families now are, by a patriarchal despot, and having scarcely any community of 
interest, or necessary mental communion, with other human beings. . . . [I]f public spirit, generous sentiments, or true 
justice and equality are desired, association, not isolation, of interests, is the school in which these excellences are 
nurtured.”). 
 
25  Id. at 791 (“Eventually, and in perhaps a less remote future than may be supposed, we may, through the co-
operative principle, see our way to a change in society, which would combine the freedom and independence of the 
individual, with the moral, intellectual, and economical advantages of aggregate production; and which, without violence 
or spoliation, or even any sudden disturbance of existing habits and expectations, would realize, at least in the industrial 
department, the best aspirations of the democratic spirit, by putting an end to the division of society into the industrious 
and the idle, and effacing all social distinctions but those fairly earned by personal services and exertions.”). 
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who are directly interested in their cooperative firms’ success will eventually result in the 
predominance of such firms.26 
In this passage, Mill suggests both that the move to the predominance of cooperative 
associations will be a contingent outcome of competitive market processes and that the universal 
adoption of cooperative ownership and management would not be a requirement of justice.  Later 
passages in this chapter confirm this reading, as Mill argues, in opposition to “Socialist writers,” that 
competition is “indispensable to progress,” such that “every restriction of it is an evil, and every 
extension of it, even if for the time injuriously affecting some class of labourers, is always an ultimate 
good.”27  Moreover, Mill also implies that even in the ideal future he envisions, there will still be 
some – i.e., “the least valuable work-people” – who work for wages in non-cooperative firms.  This 
would not be possible if a state’s business organization or other laws made workplace democracy 
mandatory, so Mill neither predicts nor requires a society in which traditional wage labor is legally 
precluded.  Accordingly, it seems likely that Mill would strongly resist any suggestion that states 
should make workplace democracy mandatory via regulation rather than letting market processes 
determine the relative successes of capitalist and cooperative firms, even if the continued existence 
of traditional wage labor relationships would be detrimental to the interests of some workers.   
It is also noteworthy that Mill repeatedly expresses contempt for those workers who would 
choose to work for wages instead of taking advantage of the option to form or join cooperative 
ventures to their fates on the hired labor market.  In addition to the above-cited passages in which 
                                                          
26  Id. at 790-91 (“[I]t will be desirable, and perhaps for a considerable length of time, that individual capitalists, 
associating their work-people in the profits, should coexist with even those co-operative societies  which are faithful to 
the co-operative principle. . . . When, however, co-operative societies shall have sufficiently multiplied, it is not probable 
that any but the least valuable work-people will any longer consent to work all their lives for wages merely; both private 
capitalists and associations will gradually find it necessary to make the entire body of labourers participants in profits.”). 
 
27  Id. at 793.   
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Mill claims that hired laborers are too selfish and unprincipled to “give good work for good wages”28 
and suggests that in future, only “the least valuable work-people” will work for “wages merely,”29 
Mill also suggests that only those who lacked “understanding” and virtue would forgo the 
cooperative option in favor of wage labor.30 
Similarly, Mill argues elsewhere that “there can be little doubt that the status of hired 
labourers will gradually tend to confine itself to the description of work-people whose low moral 
qualities render them unfit for anything more independent.”31   
It is striking that Mill, who demonstrates great concern for the plight of “the labouring 
classes” and optimism for their potential, also expresses such disdain for any who would choose to 
work as hired laborers despite having the option to form or join cooperative associations.  What 
could be the source of Mill’s condescension, and why does he think it a sign of “low moral quality” 
or a lack of understanding and virtue for a worker to eschew cooperative labor?  We will return to 
this question later, but for now, note that since most workers still do not work in cooperative 
associations, Mill’s remarks imply that most of us are foolish, selfish, and vicious, unless he could 
appeal to some alternative explanation for our refusal to embrace the cooperative principle.     
Finally, given that Mill does not advocate making workplace democracy mandatory, what, if 
anything, does he think the state should do to enable and/or encourage the formation of 
cooperative associations?  Mill notes that “[h]itherto there has been no alternative for those who 
                                                          
28  Id. at 761. 
 
29  Id. at 791. 
 
30  Id. (“Associations like those which we have described, by the very process of their success, are a course of 
education in those moral and active qualities by which alone success can be either deserved or attained.  As associations 
multiplied, they would tend more and more to absorb all work-people, except those who have too little understanding, 
or too little virtue, to be capable of learning to act on any other system than that of narrow selfishness.”). 
 
31  Id. at 763–64. 
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lived by their labour, but that of labouring either each for himself alone, or for a master.”32  
However, recent “necessary alterations in the English law of partnership were obtained from 
Parliament,”33 which were sufficient to afford the laboring classes an alternative:  
Until the passing of the Limited Liability Act, it was held that [cooperative associations] 
would have been impossible in England, as the workmen could not, in the previous state of 
the law, have been associated in the profits, without being liable for losses. One of the many 
benefits of that great legislative improvement has been to render partnerships of this 
description possible, and we may now expect to see them carried into practice.34 
 
Of course, this change in the law only removes one significant obstacle to the feasibility of 
cooperative associations, and as Mill recognizes, cooperative firms face significant financial 
challenges, as workers who wish to form them often find it difficult to secure sufficient capital to 
equip their fledgling enterprises with tools and facilities.35   
Mill notes that in the case of some early French cooperative firms, “loans of capital were 
made to them by the republican government,” but he seems to regard this as unnecessary, since 
these associations are “in general by no means the most prosperous.”36  Indeed, instead of arguing 
that governments should take steps to make capital more available to workers – e.g., by intervening 
in capital markets in their behalf or by offering government-sponsored loans to cooperatives – Mill 
seems to hold that it is best for all concerned if the workers succeed in spite of the fiscal challenges 
they face.37  
                                                          
32  Id. at 763. 
 
33  Id. at 783.   
 
34  Id. at 771. 
 
35  Id. at 773–76. 
 
36  Id. at 774.   
 
37  Id. at 773–74 (“[M]any working people [have resolved to] free themselves, at whatever cost of labour or 
privation, from the necessity of paying . . . a heavy tribute for the use of capital; that they would extinguish this tax, not 
by robbing the capitalists of what they or their predecessors had acquired by labour and preserved by economy, but by 
honestly acquiring capital for themselves. . . . The capital of most of the [French] associations was originally confined to 
the few tools belonging to the founders, and the small sums which could be collected from their savings, or which were 
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Mill proceeds to give several accounts of contemporary cooperative associations which had 
succeeded through such laudable feats of “labour and privation.”  Given his approbation of these 
efforts and his above-quoted comments that competition is “indispensable to progress” and “always 
an ultimate good,”38 it seems that Mill does not hold that the state is morally required to do anything 
more to encourage cooperative firms than to render them possible by removing any existing legal 
impediments to their creation and feasibility.   
 
Section III. Jefferson and the American Frontier 
A few decades earlier, in the “New World,” Thomas Jefferson and other framers of the U.S. 
Constitution were developing and arguing for a view that is interestingly comparable to Mill’s 
proposed “escape plan” for wage workers, which I described in the preceding section.  On this 
Jeffersonian view, government intervention on behalf of workers would be unnecessary because the 
vast American frontier offered the option of freehold plots of land for any wage worker who was 
dissatisfied with the job offers available in the open labor market.  If employers paid too little or 
demanded too much, workers could simply decline the proffered jobs and stake their claims on the 
frontier.  One happy result of this availability of land, on this view, would be improved terms of 
employment for those workers who chose to work for employers – since workers had the bargaining 
power afforded by the option to withhold their labor and depart for the frontier, employers 
wouldn’t find any willing workers if the terms and conditions of employment they offered were truly 
terrible.  Furthermore, where this option is available, we can conclude that those who accept wage 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
lent to them by other workpeople as poor as themselves. . . . [T]he most striking instances of prosperity are in the case of 
those who have had nothing to rely on but their own slender means and the small loans of fellow- workmen, and who 
lived on bread and water while they devoted the whole surplus of their gains to the formation of capital.”). 
 
38  Id. at 793.  
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labor have freely chosen to do so, and that government intervention on their behalf would therefore 
be neither necessary nor justified.39 
Jefferson expresses this view with a combination of resistance to governmental intervention, 
a celebration of independence, and a particular fondness for the virtues he associates with agrarian 
living.  Jefferson argues that the European reliance on industrial manufacturing to provide jobs and 
economic growth is regrettable and should not be repeated in America: 
In Europe the lands are either cultivated, or locked up against the cultivator. Manufacture 
must therefore be resorted to, of necessity, not of choice, to support the surplus of their 
people. But we have an immensity of land courting the industry of the husbandman. … 
Those who labour in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever he had a chosen 
people, whose breasts he has made his peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine virtue. … 
Dependance begets subservience and venality, suffocates the germ of virtue, and prepares fit 
tools for the designs of ambition. This, the natural progress and consequence of the arts, has 
sometimes perhaps been retarded by accidental circumstances: but, generally speaking the 
proportion which the aggregate of the other classes of citizens bears in any state to that of its 
husbandmen, is the proportion of its unsound to its healthy parts, and is a good enough 
barometer whereby to measure its degree of corruption. While we have land to labour then, 
let us never wish to see our citizens occupied at a work-bench, or twirling a distaff.40 
 
Jefferson’s reliance on the liberating potential of the frontier is, I suggest, interestingly 
analogous to Mill’s endorsement of cooperatives.  Both thinkers believed that the increasing 
prevalence of wage labor was problematic in many ways, and each believed he had found an 
                                                          
39  HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED 21 (1993) (“If, as the framers argued, the market was 
essentially harmonious and liberty loving, and if the almost endless access to the freehold on the American frontier 
ensured that those who might happen to find themselves in pockets of dependency would always be able to escape these 
conditions and become free and independent citizens, then there was little justification for allowing the government to 
intervene in the conflicts that arose among groups competing in a free market.”). 
 
40  JEFFERSON, supra note 8, at 85–86.  Years later, Jefferson clarified his intended meaning in the foregoing 
passage in a January 4, 1805, letter to manufacturing proponent and pamphleteer John Lithgow as follows: “I had under 
my eye when writing, the manufactures of the great cities in the old countries . . . with whom the want of food and 
clothing necessary to sustain life, has begotten a depravity of morals, a dependence and corruption, which renders them 
an undesirable accession to a country whose morals are sound. . . . As yet our manufactures are as much at their ease, as 
independent and moral as our agricultural habits, and they will continue so as long as there are vacant lands for them to 
resort to; because whenever it shall be attempted by the other classes to reduce them to the minimum of subsistence, 
they will quit their trades and go to laboring the earth.” Id. at 86–87, n.1.  See also GILLMAN, supra note 39, at 25 (“[M]any 
took faith in the belief that the problem could be handled without direct government interference in group or class 
conflict by simply improving access to the freehold for dependent laborers and promoting free-trade policies that would 
provide markets for industrious farmers and cheap goods for consumers. As Benjamin Franklin put it, ‘no man who can 
have a piece of land of his own, sufficient by his labour to subsist his family in plenty, is poor enough to . . . work for a 
master.’”) (citing DREW MCCOY, ELUSIVE REPUBLIC 51, 68 (1996)). 
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attractive alternative that would minimize or eliminate the problems associated with wage work.  
Both emphasized the evils of “dependence” and the virtues of “self-dependence,” and they were 
opposed to all but the most minimal forms of government intervention in the market.  Like Mill, 
Jefferson did not hold that his favored alternative to wage labor should be made mandatory – i.e., he 
did not envision a society in which wage work was prohibited – but he expected the availability of 
freehold land to draw the majority of workers to the frontier, forcing employers to offer good wages 
and working conditions if they hoped to hire any of the remaining laborers.   
 
Section IV. Problems with the Prescriptions 
Unfortunately, neither of the alternative options Mill and Jefferson respectively prescribed 
was quite the panacea they predicted.  In the case of Jefferson’s “immensity of land” on the 
boundless frontier, the problem was obvious: land is finite.  It is perhaps unsurprising that Jefferson 
could imagine otherwise, as he was strongly influenced by John Locke’s theory of property right,41 
which seems to rely on assumptions of boundless land and other resources – despite the fact that 
Locke lived and wrote in England.42  Locke argued that it is fair to appropriate unowned property for 
one’s private use and benefit so long as one leaves “enough and as good” for others to appropriate:   
Nor was [the] appropriation of any parcel of land, by improving it, any prejudice to any other man, 
since there was still enough, and as good left; and more than the yet unprovided could use. So that, 
in effect, there was never the less left for others because of his inclosure for himself: for he that 
leaves as much as another can make use of, does as good as take nothing at all. No body could think 
himself injured by the drinking of another man … who had a whole river of the same water left him 
                                                          
41  SAMUEL BOWLES & HERBERT GINTIS, DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM 47 (1986). 
 
42  England is not a large country, especially with respect to land area.   
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to quench his thirst: and the case of land and water, where there is enough of both, is perfectly the 
same.43 
Locke provides an encouraging and vindicating apologetic for those who wish to appropriate 
land with a clear conscience, but sadly, whenever some amount of a finite resource such as land is 
appropriated, there is always and necessarily “the less left for others.”  Moreover, if several 
appropriators take the best available plots of land, the remaining land is clearly not “as good” as what 
was taken.  Although these are obvious criticisms of Locke – and the obvious response on Locke’s 
behalf is that we cannot charitably read him as holding that land and water are literally infinite – we 
might nonetheless be somewhat willing to excuse Jefferson for imagining that the truly, 
inconceivably vast American frontier was somehow inexhaustible.  But he was wrong nonetheless.   
As Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis explain, the inspiring possibilities Jefferson envisioned 
for the frontier “proved to be ephemeral,” for “abundant land proved to be a temporary blessing.  
The vistas opened up by ‘free soil’ were to be quickly shuttered, ironically by the very same vibrant 
commercial expansion that Jefferson had sought to promote.”44  Huge tracts of land were claimed 
by railroad companies, and rapacious land speculators tied up much of the remaining “freehold.”  By 
the early 19th century, the “safety valve” of the frontier already seemed out of reach.45 
Labor activist and organizer Orestes Augustus Brownson offered a similar analysis in 1840: 
                                                          
43  JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 21 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publishing Co., 1980) 
(1690). Of course, rivers aren’t inexhaustible resources, either.    
 
44 BOWLES & GINTIS, supra note 41, at 49. 
 
45  GILLMAN, supra note 39, at 43–44 (As workers’ advocate George Henry Evans wistfully observed in 1834, 
“[l]and speculation kept [workers] from taking up vacant land near by or in the West. If they could only get away and 
take up land, then they would not need to strike. Labor would become scarce. Employers would advance wages and 
landlords would reduce rents.”) (citing John R. Commons, Horace Greeley and the Working Class Origins of the Republican 
Party, in 24 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 478 (1909)). 
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The wilderness has receded, and already the new lands are beyond the reach of the mere 
laborer, and the employer has him at his mercy. … There must be no class of our fellow 
men doomed to toil through life as mere workmen at wages.46 
 
Sadly, Evans and Brownson were right in thinking that American workers were at the mercy of 
employers, but their dreams – like Jefferson’s – of the liberating possibilities of the frontier were 
never realized.  According to Bowles and Gintis, by the late 19th century, “the evolution of the U.S. 
class structure had reduced the number of owners of productive property to roughly a third of the 
population.”47  
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that although the possibility of homesteading receded 
significantly, it never entirely disappeared.  The federal Homestead Act of 1862 was not repealed 
until 1976, and some U.S. states still offer free plots of land to those who are willing to build on and 
improve them, albeit in areas that are very difficult to farm.48  Does the current availability of free 
land in South Dakota or Kansas increase the bargaining power of the wage worker in Michigan or 
Pennsylvania?  I suspect it doesn’t.  Did it in Jefferson’s time?  Perhaps it did, to some extent, but 
only for those who were both willing and able to succeed in the difficult business of claiming, 
clearing, and cultivating a plot of land on the frontier.  In any case, I will assert here that, contra 
Jefferson, farming isn’t for everyone.   
Turning now to Mill’s prescription, we should first note the apparent advantage of his view 
in comparison with those of Locke and Jefferson.  While the latter two thinkers seem mistakenly to 
rely on an endless supply of a finite resource, Mill suggests an alternative for workers that is, in 
principle, inexhaustible.  So long as there is work to do and demand for the products of that work, 
workers can choose to form or join cooperatives; pool their labor, capital, and ideas; and reap the 
                                                          
46 GILLMAN, supra note 39, at 44 (citing Orestes Augustus Brownson, The Laboring Classes (1840), reprinted in 
SOCIAL THEORIES OF JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY: REPRESENTATIVE WRITINGS OF THE PERIOD 1825-1850 301, 309 
(Joseph L. Blau ed., Liberal Arts Press, 1954). 
 
47 BOWLES & GINTIS, supra note 41, at 49. 
 
48 See, e.g., John Ritter, Towns Offer Free Land to Newcomers, USA TODAY, Feb. 9, 2005, at 1A. 
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benefits of their cooperative endeavors.  Of course, these intrepid workers must still overcome the 
obstacle of breaking into a market system dominated by capitalist producers and succeeding in 
competition with them.  However, Mill is content that cooperative firms would enjoy a decisive 
competitive advantage because of the “vast stimulus given to productive energies, by placing the 
labourers, as a mass, in a relation to their work which would make it their principle and their 
interest” to work as hard as possible for the firm’s success.49   
Mill correctly predicts that cooperatives would be more difficult to manage, but he does not 
foresee the full significance of the problems that cooperatives typically face.  Professor Henry 
Hansmann, who has written extensively about the advantages and disadvantages of cooperative 
businesses,50 offers lukewarm support for Mill’s optimism by citing substantial empirical evidence 
“suggesting but not confirming that there may be modest productivity gains from partial or full 
worker ownership.”51  However, these modest gains are mitigated, in most cases, by substantial costs 
of ownership, which Hansmann groups under the headings of (1) raising capital, (2) risk-bearing, 
                                                          
49 MILL, supra note 1, at 789–90. Nonetheless, Mill tempers his enthusiasm with a few caveats: “But to attain, in 
any degree, these objects, it is indispensable that all, and not some only, of those who do the work should be identified 
in interest with the prosperity of the undertaking. Associations which, when they have been successful, renounce the 
essential principle of the system, and become joint-stock companies of a limited number of shareholders, who differ 
from those of other companies only in being working men; associations which employ hired labourers without any 
interest in the profits . . . are, no doubt, exercising a lawful right in honestly employing the existing system of society to 
improve their position as individuals, but it is not  from them that anything need be expected towards replacing that 
system by a better. Neither will such societies, in the long run, succeed in keeping their ground against individual 
competition. Individual management, by the one person principally interested, has great advantages over every 
description of collective management. Co-operation has but one thing to oppose to those advantages – the common 
interest of all the workers in the work.”). Id. at 790. 
 
50  Hansmann’s discussion concerns firms with what he defines as “direct employee ownership,” i.e., “in which 
ownership of the firm is entirely in the hands of some or all of its employees.”  Henry Hansmann, Employee Ownership of 
Firms, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND LAW 43 (Peter Newman ed. Stockton Press 1998). 
 
51  Id. at 44 (citing J. Blasi and D. Kruse, THE NEW OWNERS: THE MASS EMERGENCE OF EMPLOYEE 
OWNERSHIP IN PUBLIC COMPANIES AND WHAT IT MEANS TO AMERICAN BUSINESS (1991)); but see Schwartz, supra note 
4, at 231(“A review of eleven economic studies of the effect of worker decision making on productivity in labor-
managed firms found that the ‘relationship was positive in seven cases, negative in two, and zero in two.’” 
(citing GREGORY K. DOW, GOVERNING THE FIRM: WORKERS’ CONTROL IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 43, 183 (2003) 
(citing Chris Doucouliagos, Worker Participation and Productivity in Labor-Managed Firms and Participatory Capitalist Firms: A 
Meta-Analysis, 49 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 58, 58-77 (1995)))). 
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and (3) collective decision-making.  Mill anticipates each of these, to some extent, and he appears to 
understand the first two costs of ownership reasonably well.52   
However, if Hansmann’s analysis is accurate, Mill fails to appreciate the substantial 
limitations imposed by the costs associated with collective decision-making, which Hansmann 
summarizes as follows: 
Employees’ interests can diverge concerning many aspects of a firm’s operations. Most 
obviously, employees are likely to differ among themselves concerning the relative wages 
they are to be paid. Likewise, employees may differ concerning working conditions, the kind 
and amount of work each is assigned, and – when things go poorly – which jobs are to be 
eliminated and who is to be laid off. … These and other differences of interest among a 
firm’s employees are likely to grow, moreover, as the division of labour and diversity of tasks 
within a firm increase. … The resulting costs … appear to play a crucial role in determining 
when and where employees participate in firm governance, suggesting strongly that these 
costs commonly dominate the other costs and benefits of employee ownership surveyed 
here.53 
 
As a result, Hansmann notes that “[i]t is very rare to see a cooperative in which ownership is shared 
by a group … that exhibits any substantial diversity,” and “[t]his suggests, in turn, that homogeneity 
of interest among investors of capital, rather than risk-bearing or even the need to accumulate 
capital, may be the real reason that modern economies are so heavily dominated by investor-owned 
firms.”54   
                                                          
52  MILL, supra note 1, at 752. With respect to capital, see id. at 774, some of which is cited above.  With respect to 
risk-bearing, see id. at 790-91, in which Mill notes: “Unity of authority makes many things possible, which could not or 
would not be undertaken subject to the chance of divided councils or changes in the management.  A private capitalist, 
exempt from the control of a body, if he is a person of capacity, is considerably more likely than almost any association 
to run judicious risks, and originate costly improvements.  Co-operative societies may be depended on for adopting 
improvements after they have been tested by success, but individuals are more likely to commence things previously 
untried.”  See also Robert Mayer, Is There a Moral Right to Workplace Democracy?, 26 SOCIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 301, 
324 (2000) (noting that “[e]ven staunch proponents [of workplace democracy] like Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis 
admit that ‘the major weakness of the democratic firm [is] its tendency to engage in insufficient levels of risk-taking and 
innovation’”) (quoting Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, A Political and Economic Case for the Democratic Enterprise, in THE 
IDEA OF DEMOCRACY 375, 377 (DAVID COPP, JEAN HAMPTON, AND JOHN ROEMER eds. 1993). 
 
53 Hansmann, supra note 50, at 45-46. 
 
54 Henry Hansmann, Cooperative Firms in Theory and Practice, 4 FIN. J. OF BUS. ECON. 387, 395 (1999); see also Henry 
Hansmann, Worker Participation in Corporate Governance, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 589, 596-97 (1993) (“No matter how large 
the potential benefits of worker ownership may seem in any given setting, it rarely appears if the workers who would 
share ownership have diverse interests in the firm. … The other costs associated with worker ownership – in particular, 
poor diversification of risk and the difficulty of assembling capital – do not appear to be particularly serious.”). 
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We might respond, on Mill’s behalf, that Mill clearly is aware of the crucial importance of 
ensuring that workers share common interests in cooperative associations, as he holds that this 
would be their sole competitive advantage over capitalist firms.  However, Mill argues that this 
advantage could be realized so long as the associated workers were all “identified in interest with the 
prosperity of the undertaking” and “the common interest of all the workers in the work.”55  In 
practice, it appears that although these shared interests are necessary, they are far from sufficient for 
the success of a cooperative firm.   
As Hansmann outlines in the above-cited passage, worker-owners also tend to have many 
unshared interests and face considerable challenges in agreeing upon the appropriate wages to be paid 
for differing tasks, skills, and experience, the kind and amount of work each worker must perform, 
and all the myriad decisions necessary for running a successful business.  If Hansmann is correct 
that cooperative firms require extreme homogeneity in order to function successfully, this 
requirement seems not only to limit the number of cooperative associations that could be formed 
from a heterogeneous population, but also to discourage the fostering of individuality among 
workers, which Mill would presumably consider singularly unappealing.   
Moreover, as the above-described difficulties illustrate, co-managing a cooperative enterprise 
is extremely difficult work that requires a particular set of skills and abilities.  Managing a business – 
much like farming on the frontier – isn’t for everyone.  Not everyone is able to do that sort of work 
effectively, and – perhaps more importantly – not everyone wants to do it.  Managing a business 
often involves relentless worries and nagging problems, and many workers would rather simply 
perform their tasks, pick up their paychecks, and not give a further thought to work after they leave 
for the day.  Are such people necessarily weak-minded and lacking in virtue – as Mill suggests – if 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
55  MILL, supra note 1, at 790. 
25 
 
they would refuse to endure the stress of co-managing a firm in order to further the cooperative 
principle?  We will return to this question in Section VI.  
 
Section V. Exit Options 
Jefferson and Mill argued, respectively, that the frontier and the cooperative association 
could solve the problems they associated with wage labor.  In part, they were impressed by the 
virtues they saw in their prescriptions, and just as importantly, they thought it best to limit the extent 
to which government intervened in competitive market processes.  Mill and Jefferson thought such 
intervention would be unnecessary, since most workers would opt for the superior careers they 
prescribed, but they were wrong.  What resonance, if any, could this nineteenth-century error have 
for those of us who are concerned about the oppressive nature of wage labor in the 21st century?  
First, we should note that although Jefferson and Mill were incorrect about the extent to 
which the availability of their prescribed options would empower workers and improve their lives, 
they did correctly realize – and may have been somewhat ahead of their time in doing so – that some 
sort of empowerment was a necessary component of a meaningful “exit option.”  In contrast to 
their insight in this regard, the fantasy that workers and employers could negotiate fair bargains “at 
arm’s length” was very influential in the 19th century, and its hold on our imagination persists today.  
For example, it is still relatively common to find interlocutors who would glibly respond to 
arguments concerning the desirability of, say, minimum wage regulations as follows:  “If they don’t 
want to accept a job at that rate of pay, they don’t have to; nobody’s holding a gun to their heads.”  
This is correct, so far as it goes. However, the mere absence of armed coercion falls far short of 
offering a meaningful choice to workers whose only alternatives are to accept demeaning work for 
poverty-level wages or starve. 
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To their credit, Jefferson and Mill each recognized that merely ensuring that workers are 
formally or legally entitled to the “exit option” of withholding their labor – e.g., by eliminating 
slavery and serfdom – does little to improve their bargaining position if they are otherwise without 
the means of subsistence.  In other words, we might think that the “gun to their heads” is the brute 
fact that they will die if they cannot obtain the food, shelter, medical care, and other goods they need 
to live.  This fact belies Locke’s blithe assertion that the man who encloses land does no injury to 
the rights of others on the grounds that “there was never the less left for others because of his 
inclosure for himself: for he that leaves as much as another can make use of, does as good as take 
nothing at all.”56  Although Locke did not advocate – and probably did not foresee – the excesses of 
the enclosure movements and their consequences for the poor of Europe, it is clear that each piece 
of property appropriated from what had been “the commons” incrementally divested humankind of 
what they had theretofore considered their birthright, namely, the right and ability to acquire their 
means of subsistence from the land.   
Thomas Paine argues, based on the widely accepted belief that the earth was originally 
owned in common by all humankind,57 that those who have profited most from the enclosure 
movements and other causes and consequences of the move from “primitive” to “civilized” forms 
of life owe a “ground rent” to those whose material circumstances have been worsened by this 
move: 
Civilization … has operated two ways: to make one part of society more affluent, and the 
other more wretched, than would have been the lot of either in a natural state. … [T]he first 
                                                          
56 LOCKE, supra note 43, at 21. 
 
57  THOMAS PAINE, 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 329 (Moncure Daniel Conway ed., G.P. Putnam’s Sons 
1895) (1797) (“It is a position not to be controverted that the earth, in its natural uncultivated state was, and ever would 
have continued to be, the common property of the human race. In that state every man would have been born to property. He 
would have been a joint life proprietor with the rest in the property of the soil, and in all its natural productions, 
vegetable and animal.”); see also LOCKE, supra note 56, at 21 (“God gave the world to men in common; but since he gave 
it them for their benefit, and the greatest conveniences of life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed 
he meant it should always remain common and uncultivated.”). 
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principle of civilization ought to have been, and ought still to be, that the condition of every 
person born into the world, after a state of civilization commences, ought not to be worse 
than if he had been born before that period. … Cultivation is at least one of the greatest 
natural improvements ever made by human invention. … But the landed monopoly that 
began with it has produced the greatest evil. It has dispossessed more than half the 
inhabitants of every nation of their natural inheritance, without providing for them, as ought 
to have been done, an indemnification for that loss, and has thereby created a species of 
poverty and wretchedness that did not exist before.58  
 
We need not accept Paine’s assertion that the earth was or is owned in common to feel the force of 
his argument.  Indeed, if we accept, instead, what Prof. Elizabeth Anderson calls the “egalitarian 
point of view” that all “property rights are artificial, all the way down,”59 we have just as much reason 
to reject any given artificial arrangement of property rights that is manifestly unjust.  On either view 
of the source of property rights, we can endorse Paine’s objection to arrangements in which some 
citizens become outlandishly wealthy and powerful by exploiting the advantages of living in civilized 
society, while others are left to suffer the indignities of poverty and homelessness or afforded no 
better option than that of trading abject obedience for borderline subsistence.60    
If workers still had the right to “live off the land,” they would have the robust “exit option” 
of withholding their labor and living in the commons until the available job offers were more to 
their liking.  Jefferson’s prescription to depart for the frontier approximates an attempt to return this 
option to the people – or at least, to the freeborn white male people – but it was not sustainable in 
the face of the class struggles and resulting consolidation of land, wealth, and power in 19th century 
America.61  Moreover, as Mill recognizes, however much we may yearn to return to a simpler time, 
“a people who have once adopted the large system of production, either in manufactures or in 
                                                          
58  PAINE, supra note 57, at 328-31. 
 
59  Elizabeth S. Anderson, How Should Egalitarians Cope With Market Risks?, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 
239, 242-43, n. 4 (2008).   
 
60  I borrow the phrase “trading obedience for subsistence” from Prof. Anderson, who has used it in discussions 
with me. 
 
61  See BOWLES & GINTIS, supra note 41, at 49. 
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agriculture, are not likely to recede from it.”62  Similarly, Paine argues that the greatly increased 
populations that have resulted from modern agriculture and production methods could not be 
sustained if many people attempted to live off the land.63 
Furthermore, as I argued in the preceding section, not everyone would want to go “back to 
nature” or take up a freehold and become a farmer.  Remaining in the “civilized” state of production 
and agriculture while adopting measures to move to a more egalitarian distribution of income and 
wealth could offer significant advantages to every member of society.  Indeed, we can recognize that 
workers need some sort of meaningful “exit option” without falling back on the radical “exit” of 
removing oneself from one’s community and familiar mode of life and depositing oneself on an 
unimproved plot of land somewhere on the lonely frontier.  A just society would make it possible 
for workers to find dignified ways to work for their means of subsistence without having to resort to 
the extreme measure of abandoning their communities.   
Returning to our would-be employee with a Dickensian job offer and no actual gun to her 
head, if she consents to work for sub-poverty wages, does her consent foreclose the possibility of 
making a claim of justice on her behalf?  As Prof. Robert Mayer notes, “only Thomas Hobbes 
believes that coerced contracts are valid,” while “[t]he rest of us think that consent must be 
voluntary in order to create binding obligations.”64  Does the absence of an overt threat suffice for 
voluntary consent?  As jurist Learned Hand argues, justice might require us to intervene whenever 
leverage of any kind gives one party to a putative contract an unfair advantage: 
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63  Paine, supra note 57, at 328-29 (“It is always possible to go from the natural to the civilized state, but it is never 
possible to go [back]. The reason is, that man in a natural state, subsisting by hunting, requires ten times the quantity of 
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64  Robert Mayer, Is There a Moral Right to Workplace Democracy?, 26 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 301, 318 (2000). 
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For the state to intervene to make more just and equal the relative strategic advantages of the 
two parties to the contract, of whom one is under the pressure of absolute want, while the 
other is not, is as proper a legislative function as that it should neutralize the relative 
advantages arising from fraudulent cunning or from superior physical force. At one time the 
law did not try to equalize the advantages of fraud, but we have generally come to concede 
that the exercise of such mental superiority as fraud indicates, has no social value, but the 
opposite. It may well be that the uncontrolled exercise of the advantages derived from 
possessing the means of living of other men will also become recognized as giving no social 
benefit corresponding to the evils which result.65 
 
Although Mill and Jefferson recognize the important truth in this passage, namely, that we have 
reason to “make more just and equal” the relative bargaining power of capitalists and workers, they 
hoped that legislation could be avoided by pointing to the empowering nature of their respective 
prescribed “exit options.”  To their credit, they do not ask us to accept that any voluntary choice is 
justifiable based on consent alone.  Instead, the Mill-Jefferson view seems to suggest that so long as 
an agent has at least one good option available to her, it is morally unobjectionable to permit her to 
choose a relatively bad option.  Since workers could form cooperatives (according to Mill) or take up 
a freehold on the frontier (according to Jefferson), and these are good options, neither the worker nor 
anyone else can have any moral complaint if the worker chooses instead to accept, say, a job in a 
factory or coal mine.    
 
Section VI. Two Intuitions 
The Mill-Jefferson view, as I have described it herein, seems to trade on the apparent appeal 
of two intuitions, and in this final section, I will critically examine these intuitions and argue that 
neither carries much normative weight.  The first intuition is the notion that so long as we, as a 
society, provide a sufficiently attractive option for workers, we don’t owe them anything further.  
For example, suppose you work 100-hour weeks in a coal mine, for which you receive barely enough 
pay to provide for your subsistence.  In addition, your supervisor sexually harasses you, and you are 
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developing black lung.  Nonetheless, your job is the best you can find.  You describe your situation 
to me, and I am so deeply moved that I immediately offer you the job of your dreams.    
What is the significance of this offer?  Before I make the offer, your situation inspires 
sympathy and seems to cry out for justice, but once you receive the offer, you are to be envied, are 
you not?  After all, you now have an offer to take up the job of your dreams.  What more could you 
want, and how could anyone suggest that you deserve more?  And if you chose, for some 
unfathomable reason, to turn down my offer and return to the coal mines, who would have any 
sympathy for you?  It would be difficult to make a compelling claim of justice on your behalf if you 
deliberately turned down a great opportunity in favor of your miserable life in the coal mines.   
In response, we should first ask how good an option needs to be in order to rule out any further 
claims of justice on behalf of those to whom the option is available.  That is, even if we accept the 
intuitive force of the “job of one’s dreams” hypothetical I sketched in the preceding paragraph, we 
need not accept that it extends to anything significantly less attractive than the job of one’s dreams.  
For example, if you were a lifelong resident of Boston and someone offered you an otherwise 
fantastic job in New Mexico, do you deserve nothing more than what the local labor market offers, 
no matter how dismal, if you were unwilling to leave your family, friends, and hometown to accept 
the “fantastic” job offer?  Mill and Jefferson argue that their proposed options are so good that no 
sensible or virtuous person could turn them down, but as we saw in Section IV, these options are not 
universally appealing.  Not everyone has the necessary skills to be a frontier farmer or to co-manage 
a cooperative firm, and not everyone would consider either option sufficiently attractive to embark 
upon it.  The latter point seems especially important with respect to the intuitive pull, if any, of the 
“job of one’s dreams” hypothetical.  If someone offered you the job of my dreams, and you didn’t 
share my enthusiasm for it, you wouldn’t think the offer had much normative significance.     
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Moreover, we should be suspicious of the intuition to the extent that it relies upon 
considerations of pity and envy.  In the hypothetical I sketched above, when you tell me about your 
miserable job in the coal mines, my sympathy for your pitiable situation inspires me to offer you a 
great job.  Once I do so, your situation becomes enviable, and I suggested that this might lead us to 
think that justice would not require any further claims on your behalf.  Perhaps we would feel this 
way about people who turn down what we perceive to be fantastic job offers, but this seems 
reflective of something other than our intuitions about justice.   
To the extent that we aim at a more just society, we would not want to offer better options 
to workers languishing in miserable jobs out of pity, but because our abandoning them to their fate 
would show insufficient concern for their interests.  As Anderson argues, “[p]ity is incompatible 
with respecting the dignity of others.  To base rewards on considerations of pity is to fail to follow 
principles of distributive justice that express equal respect for all citizens.”66  Similarly, we would err 
if we thought we owed you nothing further once you received my great job offer because you were 
thenceforth to be envied.67     
The obvious implication of the foregoing discussion for the Mill-Jefferson view is that their 
respective prescriptions would need to be extremely good before we would be willing to say that we 
have done all that justice could possibly require, at least with respect to the provision of career 
opportunities.  Since their proposed “exit options” turned out to be a great deal less feasible, 
attractive, and empowering than they predicted, we can readily conclude that the mere possibility of 
freehold farming and cooperative labor – both of which still “empower” workers today – do not 
carry much normative weight.  It seems likely that Mill, at least, would concede that such 
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67  Id. at 307 (“Envy’s thought is ‘I want what you have.’ It is hard to see how such wants can 
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considerations constitute a serious – if not decisive – objection to his prescription.    Although Mill 
often seems scornful of workers who would fail to see the attractiveness of cooperative labor, he is 
fundamentally committed to equal concern for the interests of all: 
Now, society between human beings, except in the relation of master and slave, is manifestly 
impossible on any other footing than that the interests of all are to be consulted. Society 
between equals can only exist on the understanding that the interests of all are to be regarded 
equally.68 
 
Accordingly, although Mill incorrectly thought that forming or joining cooperative firms 
would be more universally feasible for workers than it has proved to be in practice, we should view 
his error in this regard as principally factual rather than normative.  If he had fully understood all the 
obstacles workers face in forming cooperatives, he would almost certainly have revised his 
normative conclusions about the intelligence and virtue of people who eschew cooperative labor in 
favor of wage labor.  In other words, if he had learned that society’s standing offer to workers to 
form cooperatives wasn’t as fantastic as he initially thought it was, he would have insisted that the 
interests of all – including wage workers – be considered.  
The second intuition upon which the Mill-Jefferson view arguably trades is the suggestion 
that certain kinds of work or modes of working require and nurture virtues that are especially 
valuable to society, and that we should only encourage and reward those who engage in these 
particularly valuable and praiseworthy sorts of work.  Jefferson makes his evaluative commitments 
especially clear when he claims that “[t]hose who labour in the earth are the chosen people of God,” 
and this probably motivates his desire to rely on this as the sole liberating option for those who 
might otherwise accept positions as hired laborers.  Since reliance on manufacturing work leads to 
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dependence and moral decline, why do anything to make such jobs more tolerable?  If we permit the 
unrestricted labor market to conduct its customary race to the bottom, more workers will take the 
laudable option of farming on the frontier. 
Similarly, Mill not only argues that it is in workers’ interests to form cooperative associations, 
but also implies that workers have a positive obligation to improve society by advancing the 
“cooperative principle.”  He asserts that “in the moral aspect of the question, … something better 
should be aimed at as the goal of industrial improvement” than the economic prosperity of 
individuals and their families.  Instead, “if public spirit, generous sentiments, or true justice and 
equality are desired, association, not isolation, of interests, is the school in which these excellences 
are nurtured.”69  Although we might agree that these are laudable and desirable goals, we might 
hesitate to concede Mill’s further assertion that only those who work in cooperatives deserve success: 
Associations like those which we have described, by the very process of their success, are a course of 
education in those moral and active qualities by which alone success can be either deserved or attained. 
As associations multiplied, they would tend more and more to absorb all work-people, except those 
who have too little understanding, or too little virtue, to be capable of learning to act on any other 
system than that of narrow selfishness.70 
Which, exactly, are these “moral and active qualities”?  If all Mill has in mind is the 
willingness to perform “an honest day’s work for honest pay,” few would challenge him, but he is 
well aware that the formation and management of cooperative enterprises requires not just hard 
work, but entrepreneurial initiative and intelligence.  To the extent that Mill implies that only those 
who are sufficiently intelligent and entrepreneurial deserve to be rewarded for their efforts, we 
should resist this seeming elitism.   
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We see further hints of the value judgments underlying Mill’s view in his strong approval of 
those cooperative associations which flourish “at whatever cost of labour or privation,” without 
loans from capitalists or their government.71  We, too, might marvel at the pluck and determination 
of workers who succeed in cooperative endeavors against all odds, but our approval of their success 
should not lead us to conclude that only those who are capable of succeeding in a similarly 
impressive manner deserve success.  Mill’s view is probably not quite that extreme, but it is clear that 
he is at least somewhat persuaded that it is good for humans to be prodded and enticed to do what 
is best for them: 
It is the common error of Socialists to overlook the natural indolence of mankind; their 
tendency to be passive, to be the slaves of habit, to persist indefinitely in a course once 
chosen. Let them once attain any state of existence which they consider tolerable, and the 
danger to be apprehended is that they will thenceforth stagnate; will not exert themselves to 
improve, and by letting their faculties rust, will lose even the energy required to preserve 
them from deterioration.72 
 
This may simply reflect my own dissimilar value judgments, but I do not apprehend any 
particular “danger” in the prospect of workers attaining a “state of existence which they consider 
tolerable.”  For one thing, workers who are content to labor in relatively simple jobs will not 
necessarily “stagnate,” as they could pursue educational, artistic, recreational, and family activities 
outside work.  Many such workers view their jobs as little more than sources of the means to 
support themselves and do what they really enjoy – once they leave work for the day, they don’t give 
it another thought until the following morning.  What could be wrong with this familiar view of the 
value of work? 
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Mill puts his cards on the table, so to speak, in a letter to his friend and correspondent 
Thomas Carlyle, in which he aims to explain his idiosyncratic utilitarian commitments: 
Though I hold the good of the species (or rather of its several units) to be the ultimate end, 
(which is the alpha & omega of my utilitarianism) I believe with the fullest Belief that this 
end can in no other way be forwarded but by … each taking for his exclusive aim the 
development of what is best in himself.73  
 
This passage may elucidate what Mill means by the “selfishness” of workers who refuse to form or 
join cooperative firms.  Such endeavors require workers to display intelligence, entrepreneurial spirit, 
and stirring feats of “labour and privation,” all in furtherance of both the “co-operative principle” 
and increased productivity in society.  In contrast, Mill sees working for wages to obtain the means 
of subsistence as “selfish” because it aims only at one’s own needs and those of one’s dependents.  
When there is no cooperative alternative available, this sort of “selfishness” is not blameworthy, but 
when it becomes feasible for workers to form cooperatives, thereby benefiting society as a whole, all 
workers – except, of course, those “whose low moral qualities render them unfit”74 – have a positive 
duty to do so.75  
 
Section VII. Conclusion 
Again, we might share Mill’s approval of the traits of being active and intelligent, but we 
need not approve so heartily that we refuse to recognize the contributions of those who either are 
not “as active and as intelligent as other people” or who do not choose to focus all their powers of 
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activity and intelligence on their “day jobs.”  Many workers who are not particularly motivated or 
intelligent – or who don’t have the opportunity and/or inclination to apply these traits at work – can 
nonetheless perform valuable roles within productive endeavors that are conceived, initiated, and 
managed by others.  We might not find these “role players” as impressive as the entrepreneurs who 
define their roles, but justice undeniably requires us to recognize and reward these workers’ 
contributions.   
This points to what may be the most important lesson we can draw from Mill’s flawed 
prescription for workers’ “futurity.”  Because of his near-exclusive focus on the traits that he 
particularly admires, Mill seems significantly to overvalue the contributions of entrepreneurs as 
compared to those of non-managerial workers.  As I argued above, Mill’s proposal would be 
unappealing to many workers because it would require them to become co-managers of firms.  Not 
everyone wants to perform managerial tasks and have managerial responsibility, and we would need 
a very compelling reason to impose such work on the unwilling.  According to Mill, the reason that 
everyone should be an entrepreneurial co-manager is that this would make society more productive, 
keep workers from “stagnating,” and force them to “exert themselves to improve” and develop 
what is best in themselves.  But it is especially challenging to be a co-manager of a cooperative firm, 
since it is so difficult to reach consensus when every member of the firm has an equal vote.  Simply 
put, the problem with Mill’s proposal is that it requires “too many chiefs; not enough braves.”  
Accordingly, one reason to be wary of placing disproportionate value on managers and 
entrepreneurs is that we don’t need very many of them.  Indeed, if everyone were involved in 
management, firms might well be hopelessly difficult to run.  
Another reason to question the extent to which Mill values entrepreneurs – and he’s not 
alone in overvaluing them, as the increasingly bloated salaries of CEOs and upper management 
demonstrate – draws on Thomas Paine’s complaint about what we lost when we left “the state of 
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nature” and ceased to enjoy common ownership of the earth.  On the one hand, we can 
acknowledge that entrepreneurs are impressively “active” and “intelligent.” After all, their 
predecessors were able to entice us out of the state of nature with their ambitious plans to enclose 
and improve land, thereby expanding its productive capacities tenfold.  But on the other hand, we 
should be just as aware that entrepreneurs were also the insufferable busybodies who have thrust us 
into the modern world of 90-hour work weeks, the perceived obligation to be “productive” at all 
times, ludicrously wealthy privileged classes, and crushingly impoverished “underclasses.”   
Accordingly, in response to Mill and others who profess unmitigated admiration of 
ambitious entrepreneurs, we should insist on greater restraint.  We should value and reward 
entrepreneurs to the extent that their ambitious schemes benefit society as a whole – including those 
members of society who clean the entrepreneurs’ executive bathrooms and keep their production 
lines running – but we should just as surely resent and refuse to reward entrepreneurs to the extent 
that they have only enriched themselves, and – in the apt words of Thomas Paine – “thereby created 
a species of poverty and wretchedness that did not exist before.”76    
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CHAPTER THREE 
REVISING THE ROLES OF MASTER AND SERVANT: 
A THEORY OF WORK LAW 
 
Section I: Work Law As I See It 
  A. Brief Introduction 
 In this paper, I will explore and analyze the philosophical foundations of laws regulating 
labor and employment (hereafter, “work law”).  I will say more below about what I intend to include 
within the body of “work law” that is my subject, but as an initial description, I will say simply that I 
will focus my analysis on laws that govern the relations between employers and employees in the 
United States and other common-law jurisdictions.  More importantly, I will argue for the adoption 
of a particular way of viewing and understanding work law and an associated normative framework 
through which to assess its legitimacy.   
 I argue herein for the view, which I will call the “relationship view,” that work law defines 
and regulates the authority relations involved in work relationships, particularly those within firms.  
This would constitute a departure from the more prevalent alternative view of work law, which I will 
call the “freedom-of-contract view.”  This view holds that work law is best understood as a set of 
constraints on freedom of contract in labor markets which primarily affect decisions whether to 
enter a given employment relationship and bargaining over compensation and benefits.  
In contrast, the relationship view suggests that we analyze work law as constituting and 
regulating the nature of work relationships, which are essentially status-based governance 
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relationships.  Furthermore, a critical evaluation of a given jurisdiction’s body of work law should 
focus on whether and to what extent these governance relationships might be justified.  Accordingly, 
my positive project in this dissertation is to argue that the primary purposes of work law are and 
should be to define and regulate the nature of the work relationship, to provide effective checks 
against abuses of authority, and to recognize and permit only legitimate exercises of authority in the 
workplace.   
 In addition, I will pursue the negative project of arguing that the aforementioned freedom-
of-contract view of the nature and purpose of work law is flawed and incomplete.  The view 
mistakenly holds that work law is best understood as a part of contract law which largely consists of 
restraints on freedom of contract in labor markets.  Moreover, the view errs in placing undue 
emphasis on the negotiations and transactions through which parties enter or modify the terms of 
work relationships, to the exclusion of the “internal” aspects of employment relationships with 
which work law is primarily concerned.   
 
  B. What I Mean By “Work Law” 
 I follow what I take to be a current trend in legal academia by referring to the area of law 
governing the terms and conditions of work and working relationships as “work law.”  I will now 
expand on my earlier remarks in order to provide a necessarily rough but fuller picture of what I 
mean to discuss under the term “work law.”     
 I will first explain why I choose not to refer to the body of law in question as the law of 
“labor,” “employment,” or both.  Although the term “labor law” is often used in a broader sense in 
other common law legal systems, such as those of England and Canada, Americans tend to use 
“labor law” to refer more specifically to laws regulating unions.  This is understood as largely distinct 
from “employment law,” which is understood to refer to laws regulating non-union hired workers.  
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Perhaps because of these terms’ ambiguity, some U.S. scholars use the term “work law” to refer to 
the body of law comprising both labor law and employment law, along with other laws regulating 
the world of work.   
 For example, Orly Lobel argues, in an article titled “The Four Pillars of Work Law,” that 
U.S. work law comprises labor law, employment law, employment discrimination law, and the laws 
regulating employee benefits:  
Work law developed in the American legal system as a patchwork of common law doctrine, 
federal and state statutes, and evolving social norms.  Typical law school curricula often 
include courses related to the four pillars of work law: “employment law,” “labor law,” 
“employment discrimination,” and some variation of a tax-oriented “employee benefits 
law.”77 
 
I do not dispute Lobel’s claim that these topics constitute the “four pillars,” but I will occasionally 
use the term “work law” even more broadly.  For example, although law schools typically do not 
offer entire courses devoted to the study of the federal and state Occupational Safety and Health 
Acts, these statutes’ principle purpose is to promote and ensure health and safety in the workplace 
by regulating relevant minimum standards, so I consider them part of work law.  Similarly, I will also 
use “work law” to refer to federal, state, and local regulations mandating the provision of various 
facilities in workplaces, such as bathrooms, break rooms, and first aid equipment.78  In short, I 
understand “work law” as the body of laws in a given jurisdiction which directly define and regulate 
the employer-employee relationship, and I will therefore use the term in this expansive sense and use 
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the specialized terms “labor law,” “employment law,” “employment discrimination,” “employee 
benefits,” and “workplace safety regulations” in their usual, narrower senses.79   
 I should also say something about the areas of law that I want to set aside in my discussion 
of “work law.”  For example, state Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)80 laws bear on 
the lives of workers in several ways, most obviously by setting forth the terms under which and the 
extent to which their communities are willing to support them when they are in need of public 
assistance.  Less obviously, these laws also make up part of the large and varied body of 
jurisprudence that contributes to the definitions of terms such as “work,” “employment,” and “job” 
within a given legal system.  Despite these connections with the law’s regulation of workers’ lives, I 
exclude TANF laws from the “work law” I want to discuss because I understand it to comprise all 
and only those laws that directly regulate the work relationship.  In addition, I will exclude most 
“higher-level” policy that is arguably intended to influence employers, employees, or workplaces via 
indirect incentives or penalties rather than direct regulation of what the parties in work relationships 
may, must, or must not do.   
For example, I exclude the core provisions of job-creation and -training programs such as 
the Workforce Investment Act of 199881; the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996,82 which implemented the aforementioned TANF and “workfare” 
programs in the United States; and in general, any federal, state, or local taxation, environmental, 
consumer protection, food and drug safety, or other laws or regulations that offer incentives or 
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impose costs on either employers or employees in ways that arguably aim to influence their conduct 
in or with respect to work relationships.   
 
Section II: Initial Skirmish with the Freedom-of-Contract View 
 Despite the centrality of work in most people’s lives, theoretical discussion of work law has 
been scant in contemporary legal and political scholarship.  This scarcity may be largely explained by 
the freedom-of-contract view’s assumption that work relationships can be adequately analyzed under 
the existing and relatively well developed philosophy of contract law.  For example, Horacio Spector 
notes that the “paucity of contemporary philosophical works on labor law is surprising,” but he 
simultaneously asserts that labor law is no more than “a complex bundle of restraints on freedom of 
contract in the labor markets.”83  Moreover, Spector proposes, in an article titled “Philosophical 
Foundations of Labor Law,” merely to “focus on philosophical arguments relevant to the justification 
of labor law institutions.”84  Spector’s remarks suggest that we can understand work relationships 
entirely through the lens of contract law and define the “philosophical foundations of labor law” as 
the project of attempting to justify such laws’ intrusions into “freedom of contract in the labor 
markets.”85 
 This approach is bizarre in light of work law’s emergence from the laws of master and 
servant.  This is a distinctive form of status-based law.  Work law is no more an intrusion upon the 
employment contract than marriage law “intrudes” upon the marriage contract.  To the contrary, 
marriage law constitutes the marital relationship, which can then only be modified by contracts such as 
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prenuptial agreements.  Similarly, work law constitutes the work relationship, which can then only be 
modified in limited ways by particular employment contracts.    
Nonetheless, the view that work law might best be understood as a species of contract law 
has some prima facie plausibility.  For example, what we refer to as “labor law” constitutes a major 
component of work law, and it governs the formation and activities of unions, which exist in large 
part to negotiate contracts between unionized workers and management.  Similarly, “employment law” 
is another significant component of work law, and it governs relationships between employers and 
employees which are typically entered via contractual or quasi-contractual agreements.  In short, when 
people work for a salary or wages, they typically agree to a bargain specifying that they will provide 
labor in exchange for money and other valuable consideration – the quintessential elements of a 
contract at common law.  So it is understandable that some might believe the most important aspect 
of work law concerns the contracts through which employers and employees enter work 
relationships and specify some of their terms. 
However, viewing work law as merely ancillary to an overarching body of contract law – 
which it “restrains” – is deeply mistaken.  At best, this is a stiflingly narrow view which ignores the 
many ways in which work law supersedes or functions alongside the law of contracts.  At worst, it is 
a category mistake.  As I will discuss further in the next section, the roles of employer and employee 
are primarily defined by “status” rather than by “contract.”  We have long understood status and 
contract as distinct from and even opposed to each other, but the work relationship formed when 
parties voluntarily agree to a contract of employment clearly involves accepting and assuming 
distinct statuses within a state-defined and -regulated institution.   
Consider again the comparison with marriage laws, which allow some modifications of the 
marriage relationship through prenuptial agreements and only recognize as valid those marriages that 
are entered voluntarily through signed agreements by both parties.  The foregoing are important 
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elements of marriage law.  But they do nothing to change the fact that once one has agreed to enter 
a marriage, one thereby takes on the status of spouse in a legally defined relationship, most of the 
features of which cannot be altered by contract.  For example, spouses typically cannot sue each 
other during marriage for anything other than divorce, spouses cannot be forced to testify against 
each other in court, and spouses have mutual obligations to support each other during marriage that 
cannot be contractually waived or altered.     
Accordingly, courts have long recognized that marriage is primarily a relationship of status, 
despite its gradual incorporation of contractual elements.  For example, in 1888, the U.S. Supreme 
Court explained: 
[A]t common law, marriage as a status had few elements of contract about it. For instance, 
no other contract merged the legal existence of the parties into one. Other distinctive 
elements will readily suggest themselves, which rob it of most of its characteristics as a 
contract, and leave it simply as a status or institution. As such, it is not so much the result of 
private agreement as of public ordination. In every enlightened government it is pre-
eminently the basis of civil institutions, and thus an object of the deepest public concern. In 
this light, marriage is more than a contract. It is not a mere matter of  pecuniary 
consideration. It is a great public institution, giving character to our whole civil polity.86 
 
Since 1888, of course, we have abolished the laws of coverture and enacted civil rights legislation 
protecting the rights of women, and the law no longer sees the parties to a marriage relationship as 
“merged into one.”  However, despite the greatly increased “independence” of the parties to 
modern-day marriage contracts, 21st-Century courts continue to reaffirm the essentially status-based 
nature of the marriage relationship.  For example, in its landmark 2003 decision holding that same-
sex couples have the right to marry under the Massachusetts Constitution, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court’s majority opinion explains that “marriage is not a mere contract between two 
parties but a legal status from which certain rights and obligations arise.”87  Yet more recently, the 
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federal District Court for the Northern District of California held, in Perry v. Schwarzenegger,88 that the 
U.S. Constitution guarantees a right to same-sex marriage.  In its majority opinion, the Perry Court 
describes marriage as follows: 
[M]arriage requires two parties to give their free consent to form a relationship, which then 
forms the foundation of a household. The spouses must consent to support each other and 
any dependents. The state regulates marriage because marriage creates stable households, 
which in turn form the basis of a stable, governable populace. … [T]he evidence shows that 
the movement of marriage away from a gendered institution and toward an institution free 
from state-mandated gender roles reflects an evolution in the understanding of gender rather 
than a change in marriage.89 
 
As the foregoing legal opinions attest, although the state-sanctioned marriage relationship 
can only be entered by two parties’ consenting to sign a marriage contract, courts and judges have 
long seen this contractual element of the relationship as a mere formality in comparison with its core 
nature and function as a state-defined institution conferring a “marital status” on those parties who 
choose to participate in it. 
 Similarly, when two parties consent to enter a work relationship via an employment contract, 
they thereby agree to do so and set some of the terms of the relationship, but work law defines and 
regulates the relationship so that many of its essential features cannot be altered by contract.  For 
example, if two parties purport to enter an employment contract, but the putative “employee” 
meets, instead, the legal definition of an “independent contractor,” the putative “employer” cannot 
be held vicariously liable for a variety of torts committed by the “employee” in the course of her 
work for the “employer,” even if the “employer” implicitly or explicitly agrees to assume such 
liability in the contract.  More frequently, a hiring party will purport to agree to a contract for 
services with an “independent contractor” while nonetheless retaining the sort of control over the 
worker that is definitive of an employment relationship.  In such cases, courts have held that even 
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though the hiring party did not explicitly agree to enter an employment relationship and assume the 
rights and obligations associated therewith, the nature of its relationship with the purported 
“independent contractor” – no matter how it is described in the contract – unavoidably constitutes 
an employer-employee relationship in the eyes of the law.  Thus, even though contractual attempts 
to execute an “end run” around the provisions of work law are common – and all too often 
successful despite their illegality – they are prohibited by law and will be declared void if discovered.        
 Moreover, most of the laws governing the day-to-day interactions between workers and 
employers have little to do with contracts.  In practice, most employment litigation is prosecuted on 
behalf of aggrieved employees – interestingly, very few employers sue their employees to enforce 
their  rights qua employer, preferring simply to fire any employees who displease them – and 
employee plaintiffs typically do not sue their employers to enforce their contractual rights.  Instead, 
they much more commonly seek to enforce rights guaranteed to them by local, state, and federal 
statutes.  For example, common employee-initiated lawsuits based on work law statutes include 
causes of action for discrimination based on race, sex, disability, age, or religion; sexual harassment; 
wage and hour claims, including those based on allegations that workers have been misclassified as 
“independent contractors” rather than “employees”; and employer retaliation against whistleblowers 
or employees who have attempted to enforce their statutorily guaranteed rights.     
 Accordingly, we could plausibly suggest that it is principally through such statutes and other 
elements of work law – rather than the law of contracts – that the U.S. and other common law 
jurisdictions regulate work relationships.  In response, Horacio Spector and others sympathetic to 
the freedom-of-contract view might argue that these statutes should nonetheless be viewed as part of 
contract law since they principally function as restraints on freedom of contract.  However, in 
addition to its straightforward inaccuracy, this line of reasoning is problematic in that it implies that 
we should conceive of a great many distinct bodies of law as somehow ancillary to – or mere 
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“branches” of – contract law.  For example, it is a matter of blackletter law that any contractual 
provision involving illegal subject matter is unenforceable, so all statutes that make any sort of 
conduct illegal thereby function as restraints on contract by making putative contracts involving the 
illegal conduct unenforceable.  Thus, statutes prohibiting murder indisputably constrain freedom of 
contract by rendering unenforceable any contractual agreement to commit murder.  But to view 
criminal laws principally as means to limit the enforceable subject matter of contracts is obviously 
misguided.  By analogy, it seems similarly misguided to view work law as no more than a specialized 
branch of contract law.   
 The freedom-of-contract view’s focus on external aspects of work relationships distorts the 
primary purpose of work law by neglecting its function of regulating the ongoing nature of the 
relationship between employer and employee in the workplace, over the course of performing the 
contract.  This is a mistake because the core of work law concerns this ongoing relationship.  The 
view I will defend in this dissertation more accurately conceives of work law as specifying and 
regulating the content of the relationship.  This relationship is one of governance, in which the 
employer is understood and permitted to exercise authority over the employee.  Indeed, we might 
plausibly see work law as providing a constitution for a sort of private government that persists 
within the workplace, much as it has since work law was more commonly called the law of “master 
and servant.”  I will discuss and defend this view of the workplace as a zone of private governance 
below.  In the next section, however, I will explore and critically evaluate the ideology that arguably 
motivates the freedom-of-contract view.      
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Section III: What Motivates the Freedom-of-Contract View?  
A. Maine’s “From Status to Contract” 
It is widely accepted among social scientists and legal theorists that Sir Henry Maine was 
largely correct when he wrote in 1861 that “the movement of progressive societies has hitherto been 
a movement from status to contract.”90  This pronouncement may have contributed to the 
enthusiasm of the late 19th-century “freedom of contract” movement, and it is not surprising that 
many people took it as an optimistic projection of the future, associating “status” with serfdom or 
slavery and “contract” with liberty and individual choice.  Most importantly for my purposes, the 
freedom-of-contract view is arguably rooted in an ideology inspired, at least in part, by Maine’s 
status-to-contract hypothesis, so I will examine it closely, beginning with an excerpt from Ancient 
Law, the work in which Maine first advanced the hypothesis: 
The movement of the progressive societies has been uniform in one respect.  Through all its 
course it has been distinguished by the gradual dissolution of family dependency and the 
growth of individual obligation in its place.  The Individual is steadily substituted for the 
Family, as the unit of which civil laws take account.  The advance has been accomplished at 
varying rates of celerity, and there are societies not absolutely stationary in which the 
collapse of the ancient organization can only be perceived by careful study of the 
phenomena they present.  But, whatever its pace, the change has not  been subject to 
reaction or recoil, and apparent retardations will be found to have been occasioned through 
the absorption of archaic ideas and customs from some entirely foreign source.  Nor is it 
difficult to see what is the tie between man and man which replaces by degrees those forms 
of reciprocity in rights and duties which have their origin in the Family.  It is Contract.  
Starting, as from one terminus of history, from a condition of society in which all the 
relations of Persons are summed up in the relations of Family, we seem to have steadily 
moved towards a phase of social order in which all these relations arise from the free 
agreement of Individuals.  In Western Europe the progress achieved in this direction has 
been considerable.  Thus the status of the Slave has disappeared – it has been superseded by 
the contractual relation of the servant to his master.  The status of the female under 
Tutelage, if the tutelage be understood of persons other than her husband, has also ceased to 
exist; from her coming of age to her marriage all the relations she may form are relations of 
contract. …. The word Status may be usefully employed to construct a formula expressing 
the law of progress thus indicated, which, whatever be its value, seems to me to be 
sufficiently ascertained.  All the forms of Status taken notice of in the Law of Persons were 
derived from, and to some extent are still coloured by, the powers and privileges anciently 
residing in the Family.  If then we employ Status, agreeably with the usage of the best 
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writers, to signify these personal conditions only, and avoid applying the term to such 
conditions as are the immediate or remote result of agreement, we may say that the 
movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.91  
 
 As this passage illustrates, Maine clearly endorses the “movement from Status to Contract” as 
an “advance [that] has been accomplished” rather than merely describing it in the form of an 
observation about social and legal change.  That is, Maine means both to describe a trend he 
observes in modern legal systems and to endorse the trend as “progress.”  It’s not clear whether he 
thinks this positive change is in some sense inevitable, but he does claim to have identified “a formula 
expressing the law of progress” underlying the movement from status to contract.92  Perhaps we 
should understand this invocation of “law” as the claim that his “formula” expresses the best or only 
way to achieve progress, or alternatively, that some law of human nature will always push human 
societies to progress in the way he describes.  Note also that Maine defines the dichotomy he 
suggests in the excerpt’s closing paragraph by asserting that if we can call all “personal conditions” 
arising from the family “Status,” we can then refer to all those connections that arise by agreement 
as “Contract.”  This division allows for the possibility that connections will be “coloured by” the 
previous rights and obligations provided by Status, but he suggests that the more we can abandon 
such “archaic ideas and customs” and move toward purely contractual relations, the better.   
 There are various problems with Maine’s suggestion, including the difficulty of separating 
the deeply intertwined influences of Status and Contract.  Indeed, it is ironic that Maine insists on 
explicitly including both the master-servant and marriage relations in the broad move toward 
contract, since his discussion of these relations simultaneously demonstrates that these are among 
the most problematic cases for his “formula” to explain.  In his description of work relations, he 
argues that the “status of the Slave … has been superseded by the contractual relation of the servant 
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to his master.”93  Why “to his master” instead of “with a master”?  If Maine hoped to portray this 
supersession as a laudable move toward a relation between free and equal contractors, he shouldn’t 
have described it in terms that make clear the hierarchical and status-based nature of the master-
servant relation.  To illustrate, it is evident that we could easily describe the “buyer-seller” relation in 
neutral terms that imply nothing about hierarchy or status, e.g., a buyer contracts with a seller to pay 
money for goods.  In contrast, it would sound neither neutral nor intuitively correct to say that she 
enters a “contractual relation of the buyer to her seller.”   
Similarly, when Maine discusses marriage, he explains that the “status of the female under 
Tutelage, if the tutelage be understood of persons other than her husband, has also ceased to exist; 
from her coming of age to her marriage all the relations she may form are relations of contract.”  As 
Nora Flum notes, Maine simply can’t pretend that married women of his era could be viewed as 
entities who were separable from their status:  
Women were only free from status when they existed outside of a marriage relationship. 
Despite Maine’s desire to show that Western society had ascended to a purely contractual 
level, he was forced to concede that married women were prohibited from contract and thus 
existed in a status relationship within the family.94 
 
Furthermore, as Maine was surely aware, life as an unmarried woman – in his time and long thereafter 
– typically did not offer significant freedom, contractual or otherwise.  Phyllis Atwell, a former 
sociology professor of mine, once asserted that the reason the father of the bride traditionally “gives 
her away” during the wedding ceremony is “so that the woman is always under male supervision.”  
I’m not sure to what extent her assertion is historically or culturally accurate, but it sounds roughly 
right to me as a plausible explanation of the tradition as it persists today, and I suspect it would have 
seemed obviously right to Maine and his contemporaries.   
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B. Where Maine Went Wrong 
 Notwithstanding its substantial influence, Maine’s hypothesis has also been the subject of 
sustained criticism.  For example, legal academic Nathan Isaacs writes as follows in a 1917 article in 
the Yale Law Journal: 
The formula has generally been gratefully accepted as a very useful summary of many 
phenomena encountered in legal history. … Now and then the formula has been modified 
or limited, or exceptions to it have been noted; then the universality of the doctrines began 
to be questioned; and finally its applicability to Anglo-American law has been categorically 
denied.95   
 
Isaacs attributes the above-referenced “categorical denial” to Roscoe Pound, then-dean of Harvard 
Law School, who was a prominent representative of the emerging school of thought known as “legal 
realism” or “sociological jurisprudence.”96   
Pound did, indeed, deny that Maine’s formula had “any basis in Anglo-American legal 
history,” and argued that Maine’s purported historical insight constituted little more than his 
endorsement of a short-lived and anachronistic phase of 19th-Century jurisprudence: 
Puritanism, the attitude of protecting the individual against government and society which 
the common-law courts had taken in the contests with the crown, the eighteenth-century 
theory of the natural rights of the abstract individual man, the insistence of the pioneer upon 
a minimum of interference with his freedom of action, and the nineteenth-century deduction 
of law from a metaphysical principle of individual liberty – all these combined to make 
jurists and lawyers think of individuals rather than of groups or relations and to make jurists 
think ill of anything that had the look of the archaic institution of status. The Romanist idea 
of contract became the popular juristic idea and, as Maitland puts it, contract  became “the 
greediest of legal categories.” ... This was furthered by the general acceptance … of [a] 
political interpretation of jurisprudence ... which found the key to social and hence to legal 
progress in a gradual unfolding of the idea of individual liberty …. It was furthered also by 
the famous generalization of Sir Henry Maine that the evolution of law is a progress from 
status to contract. … But in truth the dogma of Sir Henry Maine is a generalization from 
Roman legal history only. It shows the course of evolution of Roman law. On the other 
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hand it has no basis in Anglo-American legal history, and the whole course of English and 
American law today is belying it, unless indeed, we are progressing backward.97  
 
 In response, Isaacs objects to Pound’s dismissal of Maine by pointing to what he takes to be 
factual evidence supporting Maine’s formula: 
Is there indeed “no basis in Anglo-American legal history” for the status-to-contract theory 
as generally understood?  Its original application was to personal relations derived from or 
colored by the powers and privileges anciently residing in the family.  Is it not true that the 
relation of master and servant was originally – and still is nominally – a domestic relation? 
And whether the nineteenth century was out of line with the common law or not, is it not a 
fact that it has made of this relation a contractual one? “Employer” and “employee” (words 
having reference to the contract) now seem more appropriate terms than the older “master” 
and “servant” (words having reference to status).98  
 
But Isaacs’ half-hearted rhetorical gestures at terminological changes are not at all persuasive, 
especially since Isaacs refers to – and is therefore aware of – Pound’s much deeper analysis of early 
20th-Century developments in the laws regulating the work relationship.   
Essentially, Pound argues that rather than moving from status to contract, the legal system 
of his day was progressing in the opposite direction: 
[M]ore significant is the legislative development whereby duties and liabilities are imposed on 
the employer in the relation of employer and employee, not because he has so willed, not 
because he is at fault, but because the nature of the relation is deemed to call for it.  Such is 
the settled tendency of the present. To me it seems a return to the common-law conception 
of the relation of master and servant, with reciprocal rights and duties and with liabilities 
imposed in view of the exigencies of the relation. …  For it is not out of line with the 
common law to deal with causes where the relation of master and servant exists differently 
from causes where there is no such relation. It is not out of line to deal with such causes by 
determining the duties and the liabilities which shall flow from the relation. On the contrary, 
the nineteenth century was out of line with the common law when it sought to treat the 
relation of master and servant in any other way.99 
 
Pound explains this change largely on the basis of what he takes to be a widespread rejection of the 
“liberty of contract” view of social legislation that had briefly taken hold of U.S. courts from the late 
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19th century to the early 20th.  In reaction to the Supreme Court’s repeatedly striking down laws 
aimed at regulating the work relationship, during what is now called the Lochner era,100 many 
subsequent jurists and legislators focused their regulatory efforts on attaching more and more 
significance to the status of the parties to such relationships rather than the contracts by which they 
entered them.  Pound argues in the above-quoted passage that this more recent movement of the 
law not only demonstrated that the early 20th-Century legal “progress” was from contract to status, 
but also that this was a return to the “spirit” of the traditional common law rather than a departure 
from it.   
 I am persuaded by Pound’s explanation and reasoning in the above-quoted passages that 
Maine’s status-to-contract formula has not merited the undue influence it has had on subsequent 
legal and social theory, in large part because it has not proved accurate in the intervening decades.  
Moreover, I believe that Pound’s argument against the applicability of Maine’s view also suggests an 
indictment of the freedom-of-contract view of work law.  I will expand on this contention in the 
next section.  
 
Section IV: Why the Freedom-of-Contract View Is Mistaken  
A. Master and Servant  
 West Publishing’s legal research Web site Westlaw.com provides access to myriad legal 
materials, including state and federal cases, law review articles, statutes, regulations, and transcripts 
of legislative debates.  Westlaw also features West’s distinctive and proprietary “West American 
Digest System,” which organizes legal issues discussed in reported cases into major topics and 
constitutes what West claims is the only existing “taxonomy” of American law.  These topics 
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provide titles for the “headnotes” which appear in many Westlaw cases and provide brief summaries 
of the issues discussed therein.  The Digest System’s topics are organized by numbers as well as 
titles.  Topic number 29, “Labor and Employment,” is especially interesting.  Whenever the Westlaw 
editors judge that an issue discussed in a case is pertinent to topic 29, they indicate this with a 
headnote, such as the following sample from the Westlaw version of a 2002 case decided by the 
Supreme Court of Texas:  
 Labor and Employment 29 
 231Hk29 Most Cited Cases 
 (Formerly 255k5, 255k1  Master and Servant) 
 The test to determine whether a worker is an “employee” rather than an 
“independent contractor” is whether the employer has the right to control the progress, 
details, and methods of operations of the work, because an employer controls not merely the 
end sought to be accomplished, but also the means and details of its accomplishment, with 
respect to the work of an employee.101  
 
This example provides a concise statement of the current and longstanding common law standard 
for determining whether a worker is an “employee” rather than an “independent contractor.”  As 
the headnote makes clear, the key element in the test for employee status is presence or absence of 
the employer’s “right to control … the work of an employee.”102  This may sound familiar to the 
attentive reader, as I briefly mentioned the “right to control” test in my discussion in Section II of 
lawsuits based on the claim that employees have been misclassified by their employers as 
“independent contractors.”  As I explained in that discussion, when the plaintiffs prevail in such 
lawsuits, the law requires courts to hold that it is the nature of the relationship – not the terms set 
forth in the contract – that determine whether a given worker is an “employee” or an “independent 
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contractor” in the eyes of the law.  This alone seems to give us a reason to reject the freedom-of-
contract view.       
 Moreover, the headnote implies that the relationship in question has been defined by the 
same “right to control” test for quite some time, as it notes parenthetically that the content of the 
current section 231Hk29 of topic 29, which sets forth the test, was previously listed as sections 
255k5 and 255k1 of a subject area titled “Master and Servant.”  From its inception in 1910 until the 
late 20th Century, West’s Digest System referred to the body of law governing work relationships as 
the law of “Master and Servant.”  I have referred to the “master-servant” relation several times in 
previous sections, especially in my discussions of Maine’s formula and Pound’s criticism thereof, and 
I suspect that this term for the work relationship strikes most of us as outdated and unappealing – 
nobody wants to think of herself as a “servant” toiling for a “master.”  Fortunately for our modern 
sensibilities – but unfortunately perhaps for sociological clarity and historical understanding – West 
and other legal commentators largely abandoned the old terminology in the latter half of the 20th 
century.  As the above headnote indicates, West’s Digest topic “Master and Servant” became “Labor 
and Employment,” and – as Isaacs was quick to point out in his defense of Maine’s formula – the 
roles of “master” and “servant” became “employer” and “employee.”  However euphonious these 
changes in terminology might be, it seems clear that according to the understanding of work law 
advanced by the editors of West’s Digest System, the new names were appended to existing roles 
rather than creating new ones.   
 These roles – whether “master” and “servant” or “employer” and “employee” – are clearly 
better conceived as designations of status rather than creations of the agreements between free and 
independent contractors.  I hold that the main aim of work law has long been and continues to be 
the legal recognition and regulation of hierarchical relationships in which the “master” is understood 
and permitted to exercise a significant right of control over the “servant.”  This uncomfortable 
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reality is obviously in tension with Maine’s view of progressive modernity as moving “from status to 
contract.”103  While there is undoubtedly some truth to Maine’s generalization, the work relationship 
is one of several important exceptions to its applicability.  This is because work law provides work 
relationships with much of their default – and in many cases, mandatory – content, such that many 
or even most aspects of the work relationship are governed by non-contracted terms of work law 
rather than bargained-for results of negotiation between two independent parties.  For example, 
many substantive rights and obligations attach to the employer-employee relation – such as those 
requiring minimum wages, maximum hours, and the employer’s provision of worker’s compensation 
and unemployment insurance – and employers often seek to avoid these obligations by inducing 
workers to agree to work as purported “independent contractors.”  But work law prohibits this 
practice by defining and identifying work relationships in its own mandatory terms, which cannot 
lawfully be waived by contract.  Thus, one’s rights and obligations as a party to a work relationship 
are mostly determined by one’s status – i.e., whether one meets the legal definition of a “master” or 
a “servant” – rather than by contract.  And therefore, the freedom-of-contract view is as deeply 
mistaken, and for many of the same reasons, as Maine’s status-to-contract formula.  At the risk of 
appearing glib, I’ll venture that the body of law in question just doesn’t work that way. 
 
B. Blackstone   
 As I argue above, the roots of modern work law in the master-servant relation provide 
compelling reasons to reject the freedom-of-contract view.  This is because the master-servant 
relation is clearly one of status rather than contract, and it requires that the parties to it accept status-
based roles within a hierarchical governance relationship.  To illustrate this point in more detail, I 
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will now turn to a discussion of the 18th-Century master-servant relation as described in Sir William 
Blackstone’s 1759 treatise Commentaries on the Laws of England.   
 It is difficult to overstate the influence of Blackstone’s Commentaries, especially in the United 
States.  As Amy Dru Stanley explains – after referring to the Commentaries as “the most influential 
legal treatise in the Anglo-American world of the late eighteenth century” – the pioneering lawyers 
who brought the common law to the New World in the 18th century didn’t have the luxury of 
acquiring or transporting extensive libraries of legal tomes, but they could easily carry the two-
volume Commentaries on a mule or wagon and count on it to offer an answer to nearly any question 
about the common law they might encounter.104   Accordingly, Blackstone became, perhaps as much 
as a matter of convenience as of respect for his work, even more influential in America than in his 
native country.  Note, however, that I do not emphasize the influence of his treatise in order to 
bolster its credibility as an accurate description of the “laws of England” in Blackstone’s day.  Instead, 
I mean to suggest that Blackstone’s Commentaries had a perhaps inordinately powerful effect on what 
most jurists and lawyers believed about the common law – especially in America – whether or not all, 
most or few of his pronouncements were accurate.  Accordingly, it is worthwhile to look at what 
Blackstone said about the law of master and servant in order to trace its influences on modern work 
law.     
 The England of Blackstone’s time was marked by a meticulously ordered hierarchy of social 
statuses and titles, and Blackstone explains at length how the various sorts of nobility and 
“commonalty” – i.e., all those persons who lacked clerical or noble rank – were ranked and 
esteemed: 
The civil state consists of the nobility and the commonalty. Of the nobility, the peerage of 
Great Britain, or lords temporal, as forming, together with the bishops, one of the supreme 
branches of the legislature, I have before sufficiently spoken: we are here to consider them 
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according to their several degrees, or titles of honour. All degrees of nobility and honour are 
derived from the king as their fountain: and he may institute what new titles he pleases. 
Hence it is that all degrees of nobility are not of equal antiquity. Those now in use are dukes, 
marquesses, earls, viscounts, and barons.105   
 
After extensive discussion of the above-listed ranks of the nobility, Blackstone moves on to discuss 
the commonalty: 
The commonalty, like the nobility, are divided into several degrees; and, as the lords, though 
different in rank, yet all of them are peers in respect of their nobility, so the commoners, 
though some are greatly superior to others, yet all are in law peers, in respect of their want of 
nobility.106 
 
Blackstone then describes in great detail the various sorts of knights, including knights of the 
garter, knights banneret, knights of the bath, and knights bachelors.  These are the highest-ranking 
members of the commonalty, according to Blackstone and his contemporaries, and their titles are 
“names of dignity.”  He then offers a summary of the remaining ranks of the commonalty: 
These, Sir Edward Coke says, are all the names of dignity in this kingdom, esquires and 
gentlemen being only names of worship. But before these last the heralds rank all colonels, 
serjeants at law, and doctors in the three learned professions. … As for gentlemen, says Sir 
Thomas Smith, they be made good cheap in this kingdom: for whosoever studieth the laws 
of the realm, who studieth in the universities, who professeth the liberal sciences, and, to be 
short, who can live idly, and without manual labour, and will bear the port, charge, and 
countenance of a gentleman, he shall be called master, and shall be taken for a 
 gentleman. … The rest of the commonalty are tradesmen, artificers, and labourers ….107 
 
Note first that “gentleman” was a title of respect and status among the commonalty, and that this 
status could be attained by anyone with a university education and enough income or wealth to “live 
idly, and without manual labour.”  Anyone who fulfilled these requirements and could carry himself 
with the bearing of a gentleman “shall be called master.”  This makes plain what we might have 
assumed, namely, that “master” has never been a mere designation of the party who happens to be 
issuing the orders in a given master-servant pairing.  Instead, “master” is a “name of worship” that is 
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reserved for those members of the commonalty who have enough education and noble bearing to 
function in polite society, and enough money to “live idly, and without manual labour.”  The second 
noteworthy detail is that the last sentence of the preceding quoted passage is all Blackstone has to 
say about those members of the commonalty who fell below the rank of knights, esquires, or 
gentlemen: “The rest of the commonalty are tradesmen, artificers, and labourers.”108   
 Thus, in a chapter titled “Of the Civil State,” Blackstone describes the “master” as an 
educated gentleman who is wealthy enough to dress properly and live idly.  Although he has little to 
say about the socially undistinguished “rest of the commonalty” in that chapter, he has much more 
to say about these industrious, non-idle persons in the context in which Blackstone and his fellow 
gentlemen presumably valued them most, namely, in his chapter titled “Of Master and Servant”: 
The three great relations in private life are, 1. That of master and servant; which is founded in 
convenience, whereby a man is directed to call in the assistance of others, where his own 
skill and labour will not be sufficient to answer the cares incumbent upon him. 2. That of 
husband and wife; which is founded in nature, but modified by civil society: the one directing 
man to continue and multiply his species, the other prescribing the manner in which that 
natural impulse must be confined and regulated. 3. That of parent and child, which is 
consequential to that of marriage, being its principal end and design: and it is by virtue of 
this relation that infants are protected, maintained, and educated.109 
 
Blackstone’s description of the master-servant relation as one of three great relations in private life is 
not at all consistent with the standard freedom-of-contract view of employment as an arms-length 
arrangement that is separate from home and family. In Blackstone’s time, servants were considered 
members of their masters’ households, and many interesting consequences followed from the 
domestic nature of the relation.   
 First, Blackstone explains that the master of a household was not only in charge of his wife, 
children, servants, and other inferiors, but also responsible for most torts committed by them.  This 
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is because they were viewed by the law as extensions of his person, under his care, and among his 
many responsibilities: 
A master is, lastly, chargeable if any of his family layeth or casteth any thing out of his house 
into the street or common highway, to the damage of any individual, or the common 
nuisance of his majesty’s liege people: for the master hath the superintendence and charge of 
all his household.110 
 
The master’s responsibility for the actions of his servants or other members of his household also 
extended to any business they might transact in accordance with his orders or in cases in which the 
master did not explicitly order or authorize the transaction, but third parties might reasonably 
believe that the servants were acting at the master’s behest:  
[W]hatever a servant is permitted to do in the usual course of [the master’s] business, is 
equivalent to a  general command. … A wife, a friend, a relation, that use to transact business 
for a man, are quoad hoc his servants; and the principal must answer for their conduct: for the 
law implies, that they act under a general command; and without such a doctrine as this no 
mutual intercourse between man and man could subsist with any tolerable convenience.111 
 
The master, accordingly, was quite generally held responsible for the acts of all those who 
were part of his household and therefore “under his charge.”  It is noteworthy that the master’s 
wife, friend, or other relations could sometimes be viewed as “servants” in this context.  It seems 
that all members of the master’s household were seen to be at his service and working for his 
purposes, so if they caused damage or transacted business, the master could be held responsible.  
This general doctrine survives in the modern common law rule of respondeat superior or “vicarious 
liability,” according to which the principal of an agent – often, though not always, the employer of 
an employee – may be held liable for torts of the agent committed while acting for the principal or 
for business transacted by the agent on the principal’s behalf.   
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 Blackstone discusses various classes of servants, including menial servants, apprentices, 
labourers, and “superior” servants, “such as stewards, factors, and bailiffs.”112  But the first sort of 
servant he discusses is the slave: 
I have formerly observed that pure and proper slavery does not, nay, cannot, subsist in 
England: such, I mean, whereby an absolute and unlimited power is given to the master over 
the life and fortune of the slave. … But, secondly, it is said that slavery may begin ‘jure civili;’ 
when one man sells himself to  another. This, if only meant of contracts to serve or work for 
another, is very just: but when applied to strict slavery, in the sense of the laws of old Rome 
or modern Barbary, is also impossible. 
 
Thus, it seems that in Blackstone’s time, one could agree to “sell oneself” to another as a servant, so 
long as the agreement did not purport to give the master power over the servant’s life and liberty.  
The agreement could and did, however, give the master a property interest in the servant – or at least, 
in certain of his services – as Blackstone states explicitly in the following passage: 
A master likewise may justify an assault in defence of his servant, and a servant in defence of 
his master: the master, because he has an interest in his servant, not to be deprived of his 
service; the servant, because it is part of his duty, for which he receives his wages, to stand 
by and defend his master. Also if any person do hire or retain my servant, being in my 
service, for which the servant departeth from me and goeth to serve the other, I may have an 
action for damages against both the new master and the servant, or either of them ….  The 
reason and foundation upon which all this doctrine is built, seem to be the property that 
every man has in the service of his domestics; acquired by the contract of hiring, and 
purchased by giving them wages.113 
 
This, to me, is the most striking passage in the chapter.  Blackstone makes clear that the 
master has an interest – a property interest, no less – in the “service of his domestics,” such that he 
would be justified in assaulting a third party in order to defend his servant, thereby protecting the 
property interest in that servant which he acquired upon hiring and purchased with wages.  The 
servant, on the other hand, takes on a duty to “stand by and defend his master” whenever he is in 
danger – presumably the master’s right to expect this duty is purchased along with his property 
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interest in the servant, though not as a result of arms-length contracting.  Instead, Blackstone’s 
explanation shows that English law in his day assumed that every master acquired a property interest 
in every servant by paying wages, and every servant took on the duty to protect his master in the event 
of danger by accepting wages.   
 This passage leaves little doubt that Blackstone and his contemporaries did not use “master” 
and “servant” as mere descriptions of particular roles in a workplace, but rather as designators of 
status.  The servant, needless to say, had lower status than the master in all contexts: in the hierarchy 
of the master’s household, field, or factory; in English society; and in the eyes of the law.  This last 
inferiority of status is starkly illustrated by the law’s provision that a servant who struck a master 
would receive harsh punishment, while a master who struck a servant would only be “punished,” if 
at all, by the servant’s gaining the right to depart from the master’s service:  
A master may by law correct his apprentice for negligence or other misbehaviour, so it be 
done with moderation: though, if the master or master’s wife beats any other servant of full 
age, it is good cause of departure. But if any servant, workman, or labourer, assaults his 
master or dame, he shall suffer one year’s imprisonment, and other open corporal 
punishment, not extending to life or limb.114 
 
Luckily, this rule has not been preserved in modern work law, but many other influences of the 
master-servant relation have remained with us.  As I discussed above, the modern rule of respondeat 
superior or vicarious liability is based on similar doctrines in the law of master and servant.  The 
modern “master” no longer has a cause of action against another master who hires away his servant, 
but modern work law does provide for a very general duty on the part of the employee to obey the 
employer’s orders, within certain limits, and not to act against the employer’s interests while in his 
employ.  Most importantly, however, the modern master/employer retains, by definition, a broad 
right of control over the servant/employee.  I will discuss this right of control in depth in the next 
subsection.   
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C. Modern Law 
 Against the status-laden backdrop provided by Blackstone’s picture of the master-servant 
relationship, we can consider the ideal contract-based model toward which modernization – 
according to Maine, Isaacs, and many other scholars – promises to lead us.  Recall Maine’s 
approbation of this welcome trend when he observes, “Starting from one terminus of history, from 
a condition of society in which all the relations of Persons are summed up in the relations of Family, 
we seem to have steadily moved towards a phase of social order in which all these relations arise 
from the free agreement of Individuals.”115  As Amy Dru Stanley explains, this sentiment was much 
in line with the thinking of other 19th century American thinkers: 
In revolutionary America the dominant conception of covenant no longer was a relation of 
submission and dominion premised on protection and obedience. Rather, it suggested a 
voluntary association created by citizens equal under the law, a compact guaranteeing 
inalienable individual rights as well as the private contract relations arising from those 
rights.116 
 
This is undoubtedly appealing, especially when one contrasts this picture of freedom with the evils 
of serfdom or slavery.  But how accurate is this picture?  Are “employees,” as they are defined in 
modern work law, considered or treated as free and independent contractors? 
 The answer is a resounding and unequivocal “no.”  In fact, the definition of “employee” 
under both the common law and statutory law of work is now and has long been, essentially, “one 
who works under the control and authority of another and is not an independent contractor.”  Noah 
Zatz explains the rule defining “employee” as follows: 
Most federal employment statutes contain brief, vague, and often circular definitions of the 
related  concepts of employee, employer, and employment. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 
(f), 2000e-2(a) (2000) (… defining an “employee” as “an individual employed by an 
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employer” and an employer as “a person . . . who has . . . employees”). The Supreme Court 
has held that, absent specific provisions to the contrary, such definitions incorporate the 
common-law test for employment developed in agency law. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 
503 U.S. 318, 322-23 (1992). This test emphasizes “the hiring  party’s right to control the 
manner and means by which the product is accomplished.” Id. at 323 (quoting Cmty. for 
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989)); accord Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., 
P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 445-46 (2003).117 
 
 As Justice Souter observes in the Darden opinion Zatz references, the standard statutory 
“definition of ‘employee’ as ‘any individual employed by an employer’ … is completely circular and 
explains nothing.”118  The Court’s solution to these circular definitions has consistently been to hold 
that whenever courts are called upon to construe the meaning of such definitions, they must apply 
the common law definition derived from the law of master and servant.  The preceding sentence 
may look suspiciously like the sort of “ambitious” interpretation one might be tempted to advance 
in order to suit one’s pet thesis, but there is no ambiguity in this unanimous holding – i.e., all nine 
Justices voted for it – which follows a long line of cases affirming the same rule: 
In the past, when Congress has used the term “employee” without defining it, we have 
concluded that  Congress intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship 
as understood by common-law agency doctrine.  See, e.g., Kelley v. Southern Pacific Co., 419 U.S. 
318, 322-23 (1974); Baker v. Texas & Pacific R. Co., 359 U.S. 227, 228 (1959) (per curiam); 
Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 237 U.S. 84, 94 (1915).119 
 
There are two especially noteworthy aspects of this quote I’d like to point out.  First, notice that the 
common-law definition of the term “employee” endorsed by U.S. courts is derived from the law of 
agency, not contract.  Second, the preceding quote is from Darden (1992), which quotes Reid (1989), 
which in turn cites Kelley (1974), Baker (1959), and Robinson (1915).  These Supreme Court cases – 
which constitute binding authority over every court in the United States – spanning nearly a century 
are all cited as precedent for the same holding: When Congress does not define “employee” in a 
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statute, courts construing the statute should apply the test for “the conventional master-servant 
relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine.”120   
 Moreover, Congress has consistently endorsed the Supreme Court’s interpretation of its 
legislative intent.  First, Congress continues to use circular and uninformative definitions of 
“employee” – e.g., “any individual employed by an employer”121 – in most work law statutes despite 
being fully aware of the Supreme Court’s unwavering interpretation of such definitions as signaling 
Congress’s intent that the statute should be construed with reference to the common-law test for 
“the conventional master-servant relationship.”122  Second, as the Darden Court notes in support of 
its continuing endorsement of this test, in two previous cases in which the Court presumed to 
interpret a statutory definition that understood Congress as intending to go beyond the traditional 
common-law test, Congress “overruled” the Court’s interpretation by amending the statute to make 
it clear that they did, despite the Court’s contrary interpretation, intend the statute’s definition to be 
construed in the traditional – i.e., master and servant – manner: 
But Hearst and Silk, which interpreted “employee” for purposes of the National Labor 
Relations Act and Social Security Act, respectively, are feeble precedents for unmooring the 
term from the common law. In each case, the Court read “employee,” which neither statute 
helpfully defined, to imply something broader than the common-law definition; after each 
opinion, Congress amended the statute so construed to demonstrate that the usual common-
law principles were the keys to meaning.123  
 
 And the Supreme Court has not changed its view since issuing its opinion in Darden.  In 
2003, when the Court next had occasion to construe a statutory definition of “employee,” in the 
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case of Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells,124 the Court did what anyone familiar with its 
past decisions on the matter would expect it to do: It affirmed Darden by quoting Darden’s quotation 
of Reid:  
Quoting Reid, 490 U.S. at 739-740, we explained that “when Congress has used the term 
‘employee’ without defining it, we have concluded that Congress intended to describe the 
conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine.”125 
 
Incidentally, the Court does not perpetually quote itself in these cases out of laziness – the Justices 
do not seem to begrudge the work involved in writing extremely long opinions – but rather to signal 
that it is affirming its prior holdings without modification.  In other words, the cases indicate that 
the rule has been exactly the same for a long time – at least since 1915 – and the Court is showing 
no inclination to change it in the foreseeable future.   
 The Clackamas case is also interesting because it presented a novel question, namely, how to 
distinguish an “employee” from a “partner.”  Recall for a moment the misclassification lawsuits I 
briefly mentioned – and will return to in a moment – earlier in this chapter.  Such cases usually 
involve workers’ claims that they have been misclassified as “independent contractors” rather than 
“employees” or a third party’s claim that a purported “independent contractor” was actually an 
“employee,” so that the third party can sue the hiring party under the doctrine of respondeat superior 
(or, conversely, the hiring party might offer, as a defense to such a lawsuit, the argument that a 
purported “employee” was actually an “independent contractor”).   
 In Clackamas, the defendant medical clinic sought to avoid liability under the Americans 
With Disabilities Act (ADA),126 which only applies to employers with 15 or more employees.127  If 
the medical clinic could prevail in its argument that several of its doctors were not “employees” but 
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“partners,” since they owned shares in the clinic and were professionals with a great deal of 
responsibility, then the clinic’s former employee would not be permitted to pursue an ADA claim 
against the clinic.  But the Court held that just as employers cannot evade liability by labeling 
workers who meet the common-law definition of “employee” as “independent contractors,” it 
didn’t matter whether the clinic called the personnel in question “partners,” “shareholder-directors,” 
or any other title.  If the doctors met the common-law definition of “employee,” then they were 
employees for the purposes of any statute incorporating the common-law definition:       
Rather than looking to the common law, petitioner argues that courts should determine 
whether a shareholder-director of a professional corporation is an employee by asking 
whether the shareholder-director is, in reality, a partner. … The question whether a 
shareholder-director is an employee, however, cannot be answered by asking whether the 
shareholder-director appears to be the functional equivalent of a partner. Today there are 
partnerships that include hundreds of members, some of whom may well qualify as 
employees, because control is concentrated in a small number of managing partners. ... Thus, 
asking whether shareholder-directors are partners, rather than asking whether they are 
employees, simply begs the question.128 
 
Accordingly, modern work law simply does not permit hiring parties and workers to craft 
their own distinctive working relationships with exactly the features they select.  Instead, work law 
insists that it doesn’t matter what you say in the contract – i.e., the parties can agree to describe the 
worker as a “partner,” “independent contractor,” “franchisee,” or “comrade” – if the relationship as 
it is conducted in reality, after the contract is signed, fits the common law definition of the master-
servant relationship. 
 What, one might ask, is this common-law definition?  So far, the only element of the test for 
employee status I have mentioned is “control,” which is the central focus of the definition: 
At common law the relevant factors defining the master-servant relationship focus on the 
master’s control over the servant. The general definition of the term “servant” in the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency §2(2) (1958), for example, refers to a person whose work is 
“controlled or is subject to the right to control by the master.” See also id., §220(1) (“A 
servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who with 
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respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other’s 
control or right to control”). In addition, the Restatement’s more specific definition of the 
term “servant” lists factors to be considered when distinguishing between servants and 
independent contractors, the first of which is “the extent of control” that one may exercise 
over the details of the work of the other. Id., §220(2)(a). We think that the common-law 
element of control is the principal guidepost that should be followed in this case.129 
 
However, the Darden Court notes that control is not the only factor relevant to determinations of 
employee status and explains that “[s]ince the common law test contains ‘no shorthand formula or 
magic phrase that can be applied to find the answer, … all of the incidents of the relationship must 
be assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive.’”130  Accordingly, the Darden Court 
quotes Reid for its previous summary of the several factors involved in the test: 
In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of 
agency, we consider the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which the 
product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill 
required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration 
of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign 
additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when 
and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and paying 
assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the 
hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the 
hired party.131 
 
 As the above-cited cases make clear, no matter how anachronistic the “master-servant 
relation” might seem to our modern sensibilities, it is still the foundation of the employment relation 
as it is defined and discussed in 21st-century work litigation in the U.S.  For example, the shipping 
company FedEx classifies many of its delivery drivers as “independent contractors” rather than 
“employees,” and many of the drivers have brought a class action against the company to sue for 
damages and a declaration that they have the status and rights of employees.  Investigative journalist 
Steven Greenhouse describes the litigation against FedEx as follows: 
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In more than thirty lawsuits, FedEx Ground drivers have argued that they are employees, 
not independent contractors, and that the company should, as a result, pay for their trucks, 
insurance, repairs, gas, and tires.  Many drivers mock FedEx Ground’s claim that they are 
independent entrepreneurs who can “grow” their business, considering that their business is 
delivering packages that FedEx assigns them.  Similarly, many drivers ridicule the company’s 
assertions that they can show their business acumen and increase their profits through such 
supposedly enterprising steps as finding cheaper ways to repair their trucks.  In a lawsuit that 
FedEx Ground drivers filed in California, a state judge ruled that the company was 
essentially engaged in a ruse in maintaining that its drivers were independent contractors. 
The judge wrote that FedEx Ground “has close to absolute control” over the drivers, adding 
that the operating agreement that the drivers sign “is a brilliantly drafted contract creating 
the constraints of an employment relationship … in the guise of an independent contractor 
model.”  An appeals court upheld that decision in August 2007, writing that FedEx has 
“control over every exquisite detail of the drivers’ performance, including the color of their 
socks and the style of their hair.”132 
 
The plaintiffs in misclassification lawsuits of this sort assert that it is unlawful for businesses to label 
workers as “independent contractors,” thereby shifting many costs – such as those associated with 
providing unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation insurance, the employer’s share of 
federal taxes, health care coverage, vacation and sick time, and vehicles and other equipment and 
maintenance thereof – to their workforce, while nonetheless retaining and/or exercising the right of 
control traditionally enjoyed by employers.   
 These lawsuits bring into sharp relief the main point I want to establish through discussing 
the work law of past and present, which I hope has already become clear throughout this section: 
modern work law defines an “employee” as someone who is hired to work but is not an 
“independent contractor.”  This is much the same as it was in Blackstone’s day, and while other 
aspects of the master-servant relation have changed, the test for servant/employee status persists 
largely undisturbed.  The freedom-of-contract view distorts the nature of work law because it 
suggests that we focus on the contracts by which an employer and employee may choose to enter a 
work relationship, despite the fact that a survey of modern work law demonstrates that there is 
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precious little about how the relationship itself is defined, constituted, regulated, or conducted that 
the parties can lawfully establish or modify by contract.       
 
 Section V: Conclusion 
 I hope I could be forgiven for harboring the conceit that I might have the freedom-of-
contract view “on the ropes” at this point.  After all, that view, which is arguably motivated by 
Maine’s enthusiastic endorsement of the relations created by free and independent contractors, 
holds that we should consider work law to be a mere branch of contract law, a branch that guides 
contract law by specifying what sorts of work relationships free contractors may choose to create.  
But as I have shown herein, modern work law simply doesn’t allow anyone to be both an “employee” 
and an “independent contractor,” and in the context of work, contractors are not at liberty to create 
any sort of relationship.  To the contrary, although contracting parties are certainly free to describe 
the relationship they purport to “create” via contract in any way they like, if a court is ever called 
upon to apply the substantive provisions and requirements of work law to the relationship in 
question, the court and the law – not the contract – will determine the nature of the relationship in 
question and the rights and obligations that attach to the parties to the relationship.  So why not 
simply call it a “win” for the relationship view and end this paper here?  Well, it can’t be quite that 
easy to dispense with such a doughty dialectical opponent as the freedom-of-contract view. 
 Even if my arguments in this paper convinced – or should convince – any erstwhile 
supporter of the freedom-of-contract view that it does not offer an accurate picture of work law as it 
has been in the past or as it is now, I wouldn’t be satisfied with that limited success, nor should a 
freedom-of-contract proponent feel especially deterred by it.  For I have made clear from the outset 
that although I am interested in describing the way work law is, I am even more intent on arguing 
for a particular conception of how it should be.  I assume that proponents of the freedom-of-contract 
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view would share my interest in offering a normative account of how work law should be, and I 
further assume that they would therefore argue that even if work law is just as I say it is, we should 
respond to this by cleansing modern work law of its 18th-Century trappings of “masters” and 
“servants” in favor of a work law that fulfills Maine’s bold prediction.  Shouldn’t we freedom-loving 
folk strive to discard all connections with “property interests” in persons, entrenched hierarchy, and 
servitude, and strive to remake work law to allow everyone to bargain for no more and no less than 
he or she wills?  In other words, the freedom-of-contract view might well offer the undeniably 
compelling argument that perpetuating the master-servant relation is a problem, and that we should 
solve this problem by moving – as Maine suggests – toward ever-greater independence and freedom 
to contract as we please.   
 In response to this argument, I offer a sketch of a normative argument I will expand upon in 
future work, which is that work law not only is a status-based relationship, but also that it should 
remain so, albeit with further modifications.  In short, no matter how unsavory we might find its 
lingering associations with the law of master and servant, work law’s function of offering a 
hierarchical relationship of private governance within the workplace is not some quaint remnant of 
the past that we could easily slough off.  As R. H. Coase argues in his seminal article “The Nature of 
the Firm,” modern systems of production seem to require governance and control of employees 
within firms rather than a series of one-off contracts between free and independent contractors.  
Coase entertains and attempts to answer several questions economists had previously taken for 
granted, such as why capital hires labor, rather than the other way around, and why firms exist at all, 
instead of leaving production entirely up to the market and the price mechanism.  Since the price 
mechanism could theoretically lead independent capitalists, laborers, and entrepreneurs to 
collaborate on discrete projects in accordance with their respective needs and preferences, Coase 
investigates why individuals might have reason to create firms at all.   
72 
 
 Coase argues that relying entirely on the market and price mechanism in this way would 
significantly increase costs, as it would be prohibitively expensive to negotiate and agree to a 
protracted series of contracts with various workers.  Therefore, our current system of production 
seems heavily to rely on firms, and firms, in turn, seem heavily to rely on the internal systems of 
governance made possible by our current, status-based work law.  If Coase is correct, the goal of 
maintaining efficient production would give us strong reason to continue to allow employers133 to 
retain and exercise a broad “right of control” over their employees within firms.  On the other hand, 
if Maine and like-minded thinkers are right to value freedom of contract and the relationships we 
would form thereby above all else, then we would have reason to eliminate any status-based 
influence that colors the employment relation, thereby converting all work relationships to purely 
contractual arrangements.  But this would be impracticable if not impossible.    
 For example, assume that it would be relatively simple and efficient for an individual to 
contract with another to perform a discrete task, such as moving a refrigerator, in exchange for 
payment, such as $20, on a one-time basis, so long as both parties shared a sufficient understanding 
of what the task involved, the nature of the payment, etc.  However, it would be nigh-impossible for 
two parties to draw up and fully specify a contractual agreement to the effect that one party would 
perform all the tasks that would or could be involved in occupying the role of servant or employee 
in exchange for wages and/or other compensation.  It would not be sufficient – even if it were 
practicable in any realistic scenario – to provide an exhaustive list of tasks that the servant would be 
obliged to perform and when, where, and how they would all be performed.  This is because such a 
list would not only be prohibitively difficult to generate, but also fail to provide the hiring party 
anywhere near the value he or she would receive by entering a standard, status-based work 
relationship as it is constituted by current work law. 
                                                          
133 Or worker-managers, in the case of worker-managed firms, which do exist and are consistent with Coase’s view 
of the nature and value of firm-based production.   
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 Under current work law, when two parties agree to enter a work relationship, they 
understand that they will occupy roles within a hierarchical relationship, such that the employee is 
agreeing to be subject to the employer’s authority and to do what the employer orders him or her to 
do – within limits defined and regulated by work law – at whatever times and places and in whatever 
manner the employer wants or requires.  On the other hand, a purely contractual list of when, 
where, and how the employee agrees to perform various tasks would not provide the employer with 
any of the flexibility, the ability to respond to unforeseen (or unforeseeable) circumstances, or the 
simplicity of the traditional status-based work relationship.  Moreover, such a list would offer no 
significant advantage over the similarly labor- and time-intensive process of executing a series of 
one-off agreements – apart from avoiding the transaction costs associated with negotiating a long 
series of contracts on an individual basis – to perform each task on the list as each became 
necessary, perhaps along with the worker’s agreement to be available in the places and times he or 
she is likely to be needed for these one-off tasks.  So “purely contractual” work relationships sound 
not only outrageously difficult, but downright unappealing, especially for the hiring party.  The 
average hiring party wants to be the boss, and he or she wants someone to join his or her firm and be 
an employee.  Contracts alone don’t offer these options.    
 In response, advocates of the freedom-of-contract view might protest that so long as both 
parties understand the nature of the traditional work relationship, they could use “employ” and 
other work-related terms in their contractual agreements and count on their shared understanding of 
such terms’ meaning in much the same way other contracting parties count on their shared 
understanding of terms like “purchase,” “insure,” or “widget.”  But this would be wholly parasitic 
on the prior legal constitution of the employment relationship created by work law, rather than some 
widely shared and socially constructed linguistic or conceptual understanding of the terms.   
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 Moreover, even if the parties were somehow able to insist in their contract that they were 
adamantly not adopting various pre-existing legal terms of art, such as “employ,” “employee,” “right 
of control,” etc., the newly created relationship they could thereby enter would almost certainly be 
far too unstable and uncertain for any savvy free contractor to accept.  Without a substantive, 
independent (from contract law), and fully specified body of work law to define what these terms 
mean and entail as a matter of law, neither party could assume that the right of the “boss” to issue 
reasonable orders to the “worker” did or did not include a right to, e.g., indulge in sexual harassment 
or racially discriminatory put-downs, require engineers or other professional employees to clean 
toilets or paint fences – which our current work law, incidentally, probably would allow but arguably 
should not – and/or permit employees to take bathroom breaks at will.  That is, even if we could 
somehow discard work law’s constitutive understanding of work relationships in order to make way 
for the unfettered creation of sui generis work relationships, it seems far from clear that anyone would 
have reason to seek that outcome.   
 In summary, since work law is neither consistent with the freedom-of-contract view’s 
portrayal of it nor likely to be improved by the view’s normative prescription for it, I conclude that 
we should abandon it and adopt the more descriptively and normatively accurate relationship view 
which I have described herein.    
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CHAPTER FOUR 
COMPETING IDEOLOGIES AND THE END OF THE LOCHNER ERA 
 
Section I. Introduction 
In this chapter, I will explore further the motivation and ideology underlying the “freedom-
of-contract” view which I criticize in the first two chapters. I do so via a critical analysis of political 
scientist Howard Gillman’s critique of the received view that Supreme Court Justices in the early 20th 
Century (aka the “Lochner era” after Lochner v. New York, a 1905 case striking down a maximum 
hours for bakers on the grounds that it violated “liberty of contract”) decided cases based largely or 
entirely on policy preferences rather than principled legal interpretation. Gillman challenges this 
“attitudinal” account of the Lochner era by reconstructing a principled legal ideology to which the 
Justices could have been committed. Gillman thus undermines the argument that Lochner-era Justices 
had no principled legal basis for their decisions and therefore must have been deciding cases 
according to their laissez faire policy preferences.  
Thus far, I agree with much of Gillman’s argument, but I take issue with his further claim 
that the Justices who dissented in Lochner and eventually overruled the “liberty of contract” regime in 
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), had no principled basis for their decisions and 
therefore must have decided cases according to their policy preferences. In response, I reconstruct 
the ideology underlying West Coast Hotel and argue that (at least) two plausible and defensible strands 
of legal ideology were competing for dominance during the Lochner era and that each Justice could 
have taken himself to be committed to one or the other based on principled legal interpretation 
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rather than policy preferences. In sum, I show that West Coast Hotel is no more amenable to an 
attitudinal explanation than Lochner by reconstructing the principled legal ideology to which the 
Justices who struggled against and ultimately defeated the Lochner era’s “liberty of contract” regime 
were committed.  
Following this critique of Gillman’s characterization of West Coast Hotel, I will also sketch a 
normative argument to the effect that the majority decision was not only based on a plausible 
interpretation of early-20th Century constitutional law, but also constituted the best possible move – 
with respect to justice, at least, and perhaps also, derivatively, with respect to the law – for the Court 
to make at that point in its history.  
 
Section II. Legal Premises, Attitudinal Conclusions 
A. Gillman’s Attitudinal Explanation of West Coast Hotel 
In his seminal work The Constitution Besieged, Howard Gillman argues that “attitudinal”135 
explanations of Supreme Court decisions in the Lochner era136 fail to capture the influence of shared 
legal ideology on Justices’ behavior.137  Gillman challenges the attitudinal account, in part, by arguing 
against the widespread belief that most late 19th- and early 20th-Century Supreme Court Justices had 
                                                          
135  See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 252 (1997-1998) at 252-53 
(“Political scientists, such as Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth, employ an 'attitudinal model' to predict decisions 
according to the political ideology of judges.  The attitudinal model ascribes judicial decisions almost entirely to politics, 
not precedents.”) (citing JEFFERY A SEGAL AND HAROLD J SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL 
MODEL (1993); Lee Epstein and Jack Knight, Documenting Strategic Interaction on the US Supreme Court, 4 ANNUAL 
MEETING OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION, CHICAGO (1995) at 2 (reporting that the “'attitudinal 
model' … remains dominant in the discipline”); RONALD KAHN, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY, 1953-1993 (1994) at 3 (reporting that “[p]olitical models of Supreme Court decisionmaking, which emphasize 
that Justices act like policymakers and are influenced by changes in the wider political system have dominated the 
intellectual landscape, especially among political scientists”); Lee Epstein, The U.S. Supreme Court, in LEE EPSTEIN ED., 
CONTEMPLATING COURTS (1995) at 250 (noting that “scholarly work on the role of the Court in American society has 
adopted Spaeth's attitudinal model”). 
 
136  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).   
  
137  See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED (1993).     
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largely disregarded the Constitution in favor of advancing their own laissez faire policy preferences.138  
This belief rests largely on a characterization of Lochner-era jurisprudence as lacking foundation in 
any plausible or consistent interpretation of existing legal materials.  Instead, according to the 
conventional narrative – especially as adopted and developed in “attitudinal” accounts of the Court 
– Lochner-era Justices simply decided cases in accordance with their individual policy preferences and 
then referred to whatever legal materials seemed to offer some justification, however thin.      
Based on this narrative, proponents of the attitudinal model claim that the Justices’ appeals 
to legal materials must have been mere “window dressing” for their laissez faire policy preferences.139  
In response to this central attitudinal claim, Gillman provides an extensive reconstruction of Lochner-
era Justices’ legal ideology using contemporary legal materials and other historical evidence.  Based 
thereon, Gillman argues “that the Justices were by and large motivated by a principled commitment 
to the application of a constitutional ideology of state neutrality, as manifested in the requirement 
that legislation advance a discernible public purpose.”140  During the Lochner era, the dominant view 
among Supreme Court Justices held that the due process clauses set forth in the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution guaranteed citizens an expansive right to 
                                                          
138  Many commentators trace this characterization to Justice Holmes’ blistering dissent in this case. See Lochner v. 
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (“The liberty of the citizen to do as he likes so long as he does not interfere with 
the liberty of others to do the same, which has been a shibboleth for some well-known writers, is interfered with by 
school laws, by the Post Office, by every state or municipal institution which takes his money for purposes thought 
desirable, whether he likes it or not. The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.”) 
 
139  See, e.g., Kyle Scott, The Impact of Common Law on Judicial Decision Making, 3 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF 
POLITICAL SCIENCE 184 (2007) at 184 (“Studies of the judiciary seem to be most concerned with how justices make 
decisions .... The research has focused on explaining judicial decisions as a function of fact patterns, the political values 
of the presiding judges, or institutional design.) (citing LAURA LANGER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN STATE SUPREME COURTS: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY  (2002); JEFFERY A SEGAL AND HAROLD J SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); and Jack Knight and Lee Epstein, On the Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, 30 LAW 
& SOCIETY REVIEW 1 (1996)). 
 
140  HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED (1993) at 199. It may strike modern readers as bizarre for 
Lochner-era Justices to claim that protecting the health of bakers did not “advance a discernible public purpose,” but as 
I will discuss later in the paper, they made this claim against the backdrop assumption that freely contracting adult men 
were somehow independent from the “public,” such that designing legislation to assist or protect any of these free-agent 
parties would constitute offering them an unfair advantage rather than contributing to the common weal.    
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“liberty,” especially with respect to their rights to conduct business and/or pursue a chosen trade or 
occupation. Accordingly, Lochner-era Justices were notorious for striking down duly enacted 
legislation – much of which was intended to effect popular interventions to improve the conditions 
of labor, commerce, and other important aspects of the lives of ordinary citizens – on the grounds 
that it unconstitutionally invaded citizens’ “liberty of contract.” The opposing, minority view held 
that “liberty of contract” could legitimately be limited by a state’s “police powers,” such that the 
“liberty” protected was broadly subject to regulation in order to protect, inter alia, the “health, safety, 
morals and welfare of the people.”141 This view eventually became the majority position on the Court 
in the 1930s, and it remains so to this day.   
Looking back on the Lochner era, many commentators have characterized the majority view 
as both reactionary and without basis in law. For example, Ronald Dworkin refers to Lochner as an 
“infamous … example of bad constitutional adjudication,”142 and Justice Rehnquist claims that 
Lochner and Adkins – another decision protecting “liberty of contract” at the expense of popular 
“New Deal” legislation – were “erroneous decisions” and that the Court “correct[ed] its errors” by 
                                                          
141  Id. (emphasis added).  I emphasize the inclusion of “welfare” because Gillman consistently omits it from his 
description of legitimate police powers regulation, which he defines as state regulation which aims to protect “health, 
safety and morals,” even though contemporary sources of law at least as frequently included the more expansive term 
“welfare” along with “health, safety and morals” as one of the legitimate aims of police powers regulation.  See, e.g., West 
Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 391-92; Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 524 (1934) (“Thus has this court from the early 
days affirmed that the power to promote the general welfare is inherent in government.”); O’Gorman & Young v. 
Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1931); Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187-88 (1928); Village of Euclid 
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) (“The ordinance now under review, and all similar laws and regulations, 
must find their justification in some aspect of the police power, asserted for the public welfare.”); Radice v. New York, 
264 U.S. 292, 294-95 (1924) (citing Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 395 (1898)); Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 
242 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1917); Chicago, B & Q.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 567 (1911); McLean v. Arkansas, 211 
U.S. 539, 547 (1909); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30-31 (1905); Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183, 188 
(1900); Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160, 165-66 (1895); Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 90 (1890). 
 
142  RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996) at 
208. 
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overruling Adkins in West Coast Hotel.143  In response, Gillman essentially adopts and endorses the 
reasoning set forth in Adkins: 
The statute now under consideration is attacked upon the ground that it authorizes an 
unconstitutional interference with the freedom of contract included within the guaranties of 
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. That the right to contract about one’s 
affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual protected by this clause, is settled by the 
decisions of this Court and is no longer open to question.144 
 
However, Gillman also provides extensive historical background to show that the legal argument 
recited in Lochner, Adkins, and many other late-19th and early-20th Century cases was deeply rooted in 
American cultural, political, and social traditions. Accordingly, Gillman demonstrates that the 
dominant view during the Lochner era was no mere creature of a group of reactionary Justices – as 
many commentators both at the time and in subsequent generations have held – but had a 
substantial claim to legitimacy based on a plausible reading of contemporary sources of law, as 
viewed through the lens of a historically influential ideology that valued “liberty,” broadly construed, 
above all else.   
For what it’s worth, I think that Gillman succeeds in showing that it is more plausible to 
conclude that a consistent legal ideology significantly influenced contemporary Justices’ decisions 
                                                          
143  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 957 (1992) (Rehnquist (dissenting), arguing that “the Lochner Court 
did not base its rule upon the policy judgment that an unregulated market was fundamental to a stable economy; it 
simply believed, erroneously, that 'liberty' under the Due Process Clause protected the 'right to make a contract'”) (citing 
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53).  
 
144  Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 545 (1923) (citing Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897); 
New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 373-374 (1918); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 10, 14 (1915) 
(holding that “[i]ncluded in the right of personal liberty and the right of private property – partaking of the nature of 
each – is the right to make contracts for the acquisition of property. Chief among such contracts is that of personal 
employment, by which labor and other services are exchanged for money or other forms of property. If this right be 
struck down or arbitrarily interfered with, there is a substantial impairment of liberty in the long-established 
constitutional sense. The right is as essential to the laborer as to the capitalist, to the poor as to the rich; for the vast 
majority of persons have no other honest way to begin to acquire property, save by working for money”); Adair v. 
United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174-75 (1908) (holding that "[t]he right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he 
deems proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he 
will accept such labor from the person offering to sell. . . . In all such particulars the employer and employe [sic] have 
equality of right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract 
which no government can legally justify in a free land”); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Butchers’ Union Co. 
v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1884); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908). 
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than to contend, as many do, that commitment to a legal ideology had little to no influence. 
However, I think Gillman goes too far in his further claim that the competing ideology – which 
became dominant with the passage of West Coast Hotel – was, instead, properly characterized as 
having no basis in law.   
When Gillman discusses the Court’s majority opinion in West Coast Hotel , which he claims 
“ushered in a revolution in constitutional law,” he is uncharacteristically brief.145  As Gillman states, 
the majority opinion in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish146 overrules Adkins v. Children’s Hospital,147 holding 
that “the decision in the Adkins case was a departure from true application of the principles 
governing the regulation by the State of the relation of employer and employed.”148  The majority 
opinion in West Coast Hotel includes extensive legal argument in support of this conclusion and the 
resulting decision, but Gillman is unimpressed: 
This [i.e., the claim that Adkins was a “departure”], of course, was not so – anyone interested 
in knowing the principles relating to the government’s authority to regulate employer-
employee relations need only look at the opinions and decisions of [late 19th century] state 
and federal judges… . But you can’t blame the Chief Justice for claiming that he was merely 
correcting a mistake rather than jettisoning a constitutional tradition that was a century and a 
half old.  He was less interested in clarifying the past than in forging a new conception of the 
role of the state in an industrial economy.149   
 
This characterization of the majority opinion in West Coast Hotel seems somewhat ironic in a work 
primarily devoted to challenging the attitudinal model.   
On what grounds does Gillman venture the opinion that Chief Justice Hughes was merely 
“claiming” – rather than earnestly endeavoring – to correct a mistake?  And what evidence supports 
                                                          
145  Id. at 190. 
 
146  West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 
147  Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
 
148  West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 397. 
 
149  HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED (1993) at 191. 
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Gillman’s claims about what Hughes was more and less interested in “forging” with his opinion?  
The implied argument is a familiar one:  Since, according to Gillman, there was no principled basis 
to be found in existing legal materials for the decision set forth in the West Coast Hotel majority 
opinion, Hughes’ extensive appeals to the Constitution and prior precedents must have been mere 
window dressing for Hughes’ real interest in “forging a new conception of the role of the state in an 
industrial economy.”150  In other words, Gillman appears to be offering an attitudinal explanation of 
Hughes’ opinion in West Coast Hotel.     
After going to such pains to reconstruct the relevant discourse, legal materials, and ideology 
in order to characterize Lochner-era Supreme Court Justices as “motivated by a principled 
commitment to the application of a constitutional ideology of state neutrality,”151 why does Gillman 
so readily abandon this explanation in his discussion of West Coast Hotel?  Were only some of the 
Justices – such as the steadfast West Coast Hotel dissenters Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van 
Devanter, aka the “Four Horsemen” – truly “principled,” or were all or most of the Justices 
motivated by “a constitutional ideology of state neutrality” until the decision in West Coast Hotel, at 
which point they abruptly abandoned their erstwhile “principled commitment”?  Gillman’s 
discussion of West Coast Hotel implies the latter, as he endorses the dissenting Justices’ castigation of 
the majority opinion as motivated by recent economic changes rather than good-faith interpretation 
of authoritative sources of law. 
In order to motivate this attitudinal argument, Gillman needs either to show that the West 
Coast Hotel majority’s opinion lacked a plausible legal rationale, i.e., was groundless or nearly so, or 
that the West Coast Hotel majority opinion was based on a barely plausible rationale but was in some 
sense an obviously incorrect interpretation of existing legal materials.  In this Section, I will attempt to 
                                                          
150  Id. at 191. 
 
151  Id. at 199. 
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show that the West Coast Hotel majority opinion was not entirely ad hoc but was, instead, based on a 
plausible interpretation of contemporary constitutional law.  In Section III, I will that Gillman does 
not – indeed, could not – show that this interpretation was obviously incorrect, and finally, in 
Section IV, I will sketch a normative argument in favor of the West Coast Hotel majority’s decision to 
overrule the liberty-of-contract legal regime.    
 
B. A Legal-Ideological Account of West Coast Hotel    
How might we challenge Gillman’s attitudinal explanation of the majority opinion in West 
Coast Hotel?  Following Gillman’s example, we could begin with a close reading of the relevant legal 
materials, starting with West Coast Hotel itself.  The West Coast Hotel majority opinion upholds the 
Supreme Court of Washington’s decision “that the [Washington minimum wage] statute is a 
reasonable exercise of the police power of the State” and asserts that “[i]n reaching that conclusion, 
the state court … invoked principles long established by this Court in the application of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”152  In reviewing these principles, the majority opinion notes that “[t]he 
Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract,” but instead, “it speaks of liberty and prohibits 
the deprivation of liberty without due process of law.”  The “liberty” at issue is “liberty in a social 
organization which requires the protection of law against the evils which menace the health, safety, 
morals and welfare of the people. … [R]egulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is 
adopted in the interests of the community is due process.”153  
I propose to interpret these passages as offering the following rationale for West Coast Hotel: 
(1) The Constitution does not require legislatures to extend special protection to “freedom of 
contract,” as opposed to any other manifestation of “liberty”; (2) the “liberty” protected is broadly 
                                                          
152  West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 389.   
 
153  Id., 300 U.S. at 391-92.   
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subject to regulation in order to protect, inter alia, the “health, safety, morals and welfare of the 
people”154; and (3) “due process” requires only that police powers regulation must be reasonable – 
i.e., not arbitrary – and “adopted in the interests of the community.”  In addition, the West Coast 
Hotel majority makes clear (4) that it relies on different factual assumptions than those assumed by 
the Lochner and Adkins majorities, and more importantly, West Coast Hotel endorses the principle that 
the Court must defer to legislatures’ determinations with respect to debatable questions of fact.  I 
will not argue, in this Section, that this rationale was the “correct” or “best” interpretation of 
Lochner-era constitutional law.  Instead, I hold that the rationale rested on a sufficiently “reasonable” 
interpretation of contemporary legal materials for it to be plausible to suggest that the West Coast 
Hotel majority Justices were, by and large, motivated by a principled commitment to an existing and 
well-supported legal ideology.155      
In support of the rationale outlined in the preceding paragraph, the West Coast Hotel majority 
quotes the 1911 case Chicago, B & Q.R. Co. v. McGuire as follows:  
[F]reedom of contract is a qualified, and not an absolute, right [and t]he guaranty of liberty 
does not withdraw from legislative supervision that wide department of activity which 
consists of the making of contracts, or deny to government the power to provide restrictive 
safeguards.  Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable 
regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community.156  
                                                          
154  Id. (emphasis added).  I emphasize the inclusion of “welfare” because Gillman consistently omits it from his 
description of legitimate police powers regulation, which he defines as state regulation which aims to protect “health, 
safety and morals,” even though contemporary sources of law at least as frequently included the more expansive term 
“welfare” along with “health, safety and morals” as one of the legitimate aims of police powers regulation.  See, e.g., West 
Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 391-92; Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 524 (1934) (“Thus has this court from the early 
days affirmed that the power to promote the general welfare is inherent in government.”); O’Gorman & Young v. 
Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1931); Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187-88 (1928); Village of Euclid 
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) (“The ordinance now under review, and all similar laws and regulations, 
must find their justification in some aspect of the police power, asserted for the public welfare.”); Radice v. New York, 
264 U.S. 292, 294-95 (1924) (citing Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 395 (1898)); Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 
242 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1917); Chicago, B & Q.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 567 (1911); McLean v. Arkansas, 211 
U.S. 539, 547 (1909); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30-31 (1905); Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183, 188 
(1900); Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160, 165-66 (1895); Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 90 (1890). 
 
155  For an excellent contemporary summary of the broad legal support for this ideology that already existed at or 
around the turn of the 20th Century, see Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L. J. 454 (1909).  
 
156  West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 392 (quoting Chicago, B & Q.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 567 (1911)). 
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Interestingly, the unanimous McGuire opinion was written by Justice Hughes, who also wrote the 
West Coast Hotel majority opinion.  If, as Hughes claims, the reasoning in McGuire supports that in 
West Coast Hotel, this would show not only that there was such support in existing legal materials, but 
also that Hughes, at least, had held similar interpretations of “liberty” and “due process” since 1911, 
at latest, as those he expresses in West Coast Hotel in 1937.  And indeed, McGuire does seem to 
provide significant support for the West Coast Hotel majority’s reading of the Fourteenth Amendment 
– e.g., by permitting “restrictive safeguards” on the making of contracts and defining “liberty” as 
“the absence of arbitrary restraint” – but neither Gillman nor the dissenting Justices in West Coast 
Hotel choose to discuss McGuire, despite its prominence in the West Coast Hotel majority’s opinion.   
Moreover, McGuire cannot be dismissed as an anomalous outlier, as it, in turn, cites further 
cases which contain similar language supporting the underlying rationale in both McGuire and West 
Coast Hotel:     
[I]t is the right of every citizen of the United States to pursue any lawful trade or business, 
under such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of the same age, sex and condition. 
But … all rights are subject to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the 
governing authority of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, good order and 
morals of the community.  … What contracts respecting … acquisition and disposition [of 
property] shall be valid and what void or voidable; when they shall be in writing and when 
they may be made orally; and by what instruments it may be conveyed or mortgaged are 
subjects of constant legislation.157   
 
With respect to the rationale I outlined above, this passage from the 1890 Crowley opinion supports 
(1), that freedom of contract isn’t “special,” but instead is subject to “constant legislation,” and (2), 
that liberty rights are subject to all such reasonable regulation (4) “as may be deemed by the 
governing authority” to be in the interests of the community.158  Similarly, in the 1895 case Frisbie v. 
United States, a unanimous Court reasoned as follows:    
                                                          
157  Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 90 (1890). 
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It is within the undoubted power of government to restrain some individuals from all 
contracts, as well as all individuals from some contracts. It may deny to all the right to 
contract for the purchase or sale of lottery tickets; to the minor the right to assume any 
obligations, except for the necessaries of existence; to the common carrier the power to 
make any contract releasing himself from negligence, and, indeed, may restrain all engaged in any 
employment from any contract in the course of that employment which is against public policy.159  
 
Although Justice Brewer – who joined the Lochner majority 10 years later – wrote the opinion, the 
above-quoted language certainly seems to license a broad class of restraints on any employment 
contract “which is against public policy,” broadly construed.    
McGuire extensively cites the 1905 case Jacobson v. Massachusetts, which endorses an even more 
permissive conception of legitimate “police powers” legislation: 
Although this court has refrained from any attempt to define the limits of [the police] power, 
yet it has distinctly recognized the authority of a State to enact quarantine laws and “health 
laws of every description;” indeed, all laws that relate to matters completely within its territory and 
which do not by their necessary operation affect the people of other States. According to settled principles 
the police power of a State must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations 
established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public 
safety.160   
 
This passage from Justice Harlan’s majority opinion in Jacobson – which was decided in February 
1905, mere days before Lochner was argued – arguably provides strong support for the extremely 
broad conception of valid police powers endorsed in West Coast Hotel and McGuire.   
This proximity in time is noteworthy because it demonstrates – in contrast to Gillman’s 
suggestion that the Lochner decision was based on a settled or uncontroversial interpretation of 
contemporary police powers jurisprudence – a tension between two uneasily coexisting strands of 
interpretation.  In Jacobson, Harlan endorses a broad, permissive conception of police powers, and 
Justices Brewer and Peckham dissent.  Two months later, in Lochner, Peckham attempts to rein in 
this permissive standard by insisting that a state’s promulgating “a purely labor law” is not within the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
159  Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160, 165-66 (1895) (emphasis added).   
 
160  Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (emphasis added). 
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police power,161 and Justices Harlan, White, Day, and Holmes dissent.  Accordingly, just by counting 
votes, we can see that each of these conceptions – or indeed, any conception, if we take seriously 
Harlan’s claim that as of 1905, the Court had “refrained from any attempt to define the limits of [the 
police] power”162 – was contentious, not settled.             
Moreover, while Brewer and Peckham dissented without comment from Harlan’s opinion in 
Jacobson, Harlan’s Lochner dissent sets forth substantial arguments against Peckham’s majority 
opinion.  Harlan, joined by White and Day, argues that although the state “may not unduly interfere 
with the right of the citizen to enter into contracts,” this right “may be ‘regulated, and sometimes 
prohibited, when the contracts or business conflict with the policy of the state as contained in its 
statutes.’”163  Of course, not just any state policy would pass constitutional muster:   
[A]ssuming, as according to settled law we may assume, that … liberty of contract is subject 
to such regulations as the State may reasonably prescribe for the common good and the well-
being of society, what are the conditions under which the judiciary may declare such 
regulations to be in excess of legislative authority and void? Upon this point there is no 
room for dispute; for, the rule is universal that a legislative enactment, Federal or state, is 
never to be disregarded or held invalid unless it be, beyond question, plainly and palpably in 
excess of legislative power. In [Jacobson], we said that the power of the courts to review 
legislative action in respect of a matter affecting the general welfare exists only “when that 
which the legislature has done comes within the rule that if a statute purporting to have been 
enacted to protect the public health, the public morals or the public safety, has no real or 
substantial relation to those objects, or is, beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of 
rights secured by the fundamental law” [citations omitted]. If there be doubt as to the 
validity of the statute, that doubt must therefore be resolved in favor of its validity, and the 
courts must keep their hands off, leaving the legislature to meet the responsibility for unwise 
legislation. If the end which the legislature seeks to accomplish be one to which its power 
extends, and if the means employed to that end, although not the wisest or best, are yet not 
plainly and palpably unauthorized by law, then the court cannot interfere.164 
 
                                                          
161  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905).   
 
162  Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25. 
 
163  Lochner, 198 U.S. at 68 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897)). 
 
164  Id. at 68.   
 
88 
 
In this passage, Harlan articulates the same broad, permissive conception of valid police powers 
legislation that he had previously endorsed in Crowley (1890), Frisbie (1895), and Jacobson (1905), and 
he cites Crowley and relies heavily on his reasoning in Jacobson in his arguments supporting this 
conception.165   
Harlan’s dissent also articulates another principle suggested in many Lochner-era cases and 
firmly endorsed in West Coast Hotel: that of judicial deference to legislatures, both with regard to 
questions of validity – “doubt as to the validity of [a] statute … must … be resolved in favor of its 
validity” – and questions of fact.  On the latter point, Harlan concedes that “[w]hat the precise facts 
[regarding long working hours’ effect on health] are it may be difficult to say,” but insists that “it is 
enough for this court to know, that the question is one about which there is room for debate and for 
an honest difference of opinion.”166  In opposition to the majority’s refusal to “shut [their] eyes” to 
their suspicion that many laws “passed under what is claimed to be the police power … are, in 
reality, passed from other motives,”167 Harlan insists that where there is room for such doubts, “the 
courts must keep their hands off.”168    
Four years later, Harlan’s fellow Lochner dissenter Justice Day endorsed a similar principle of 
judicial deference in his majority opinion in McLean v. Arkansas: 
[T]he police power of the State is not unlimited, and is subject to judicial review, and when 
exerted in an arbitrary or oppressive manner such laws may be annulled as violative of rights 
protected by the Constitution. While the courts can set aside legislative enactments upon this 
ground, the principles upon which such interference is warranted are as well settled as is the 
                                                          
165  See also Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183, 188 (1900) (holding that “unless [police power] regulations are so 
utterly unreasonable and extravagant in their nature and purpose that the property and personal rights of the citizen are 
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166  Lochner, 198 U.S. at 72 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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right of judicial interference itself. The legislature being familiar with local conditions is, 
primarily, the judge of the necessity of such enactments. The mere fact that a court may 
differ with the legislature in its views of public policy, or that judges may hold views 
inconsistent with the propriety of the legislation in question, affords no ground for judicial 
interference, unless the act in question is unmistakably and palpably in excess of legislative 
power.169 
 
In this passage, Day echoes Harlan’s Lochner dissent in holding that only when a statute is “palpably 
in excess of legislative power” can it be subject to judicial interference.  Moreover, Day advances a 
further argument for judicial deference, namely, that since the legislature is “familiar with local 
conditions,” it should be the primary judge of the need for legislation.   
Two years later, in McGuire, Hughes – who wrote for a unanimous Court, including Lochner 
dissenters Harlan, White, Day, and Holmes but only one Justice, McKenna, from the Lochner 
majority – quoted much of the above-cited language from McLean in support of his further 
articulation and endorsement of the principle of judicial deference: 
In dealing with the relation of employer and employed, the legislature has necessarily a wide field of 
discretion in order that there may be suitable protection of health and safety, and that peace 
and good order may be promoted through regulations designed to insure wholesome 
conditions of work and freedom from oppression. What differences, as to the extent of this 
power, may exist with respect to particular employments, … must be determined as cases are 
presented for decision. But it is well established that, so far as its regulations are valid, not 
being arbitrary or unrelated to a proper purpose, the legislature undoubtedly may prevent [its 
regulations] from being nullified by prohibiting contracts which by modification or waiver 
would alter or impair the obligation imposed.170   
   
Hughes emphasizes the legislature’s “wide discretion” and opines that one proper object of police 
powers regulation is to “insure … freedom from oppression,” which arguably both presages and 
supports Hughes’ later opinion in West Coast Hotel.  Earlier in McGuire, Hughes summarizes the 
principle of judicial deference as follows: 
The principle involved in these decisions is that where the legislative action is arbitrary and 
has no reasonable relation to a purpose which it is competent for government to effect, the 
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legislature transcends the limits of its power in interfering with liberty of contract; but where 
there is reasonable relation to an object within the governmental authority, the exercise of 
the legislative discretion is not subject to judicial review.171    
   
This principle was invoked again, albeit in dissent, in the 1923 case Adkins v. Children’s 
Hospital.172  As Barry Cushman notes, the Adkins opinion continues the struggle between rival 
conceptions of valid police power legislation that played out in Lochner:   
If Justice Sutherland’s [majority] opinion resuscitated Peckham’s mode of analysis [i.e., in 
Lochner], Chief Justice Taft’s dissent echoed Justice Harlan’s. Noting that the majority 
opinion in Bunting had vindicated Harlan’s Lochner dissent with respect to hours regulation, 
Taft opined that the issue was thus reduced to whether wage regulation was constitutionally 
distinct.  This question turned on whether the relation of health and morals to wages was 
less direct than their relation to hours. This was a matter on which reasonable people might disagree; 
and accordingly, the legislature was entitled to the final word.173 
 
Interestingly, Justice Sutherland – a prominent member of the Lochner majority – himself endorsed a 
similar principle the following year, in his majority opinion in Radice v. New York: 
Where the constitutional validity of a statute depends upon the existence of facts, courts 
must be cautious about reaching a conclusion respecting them contrary to that reached by 
the legislature; and if the question of what the facts establish be a fairly debatable one, it is 
not permissible for the judge to set up his opinion in respect of it against the opinion of the 
lawmaker. The state legislature here determined that night employment of the character 
specified, was sufficiently detrimental to the health and welfare of women engaging in it to 
justify its suppression; and, since we are unable to say that the finding is clearly unfounded, 
we are precluded from reviewing the legislative determination.174 
 
Sutherland did not, of course, take himself to be “precluded,” in his Adkins opinion, from 
not only “reviewing” but flat-out dismissing the D.C. legislature’s conclusion that its minimum wage 
legislation was necessary “to protect the women and minors of the District from conditions 
detrimental to their health and morals, resulting from wages which are inadequate to maintain decent 
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standards of living.”175  Indeed, despite these and other factual assertions issued by the D.C. 
legislature, Sutherland distinguishes Adkins from Radice – which upheld a statute prohibiting 
employment of women in restaurants at night – on the grounds that the statute before it had been a 
“wage-fixing law, pure and simple,” which “had nothing to do with the hours or conditions of 
labor.”176  Perhaps we may infer from the two opinions that Sutherland held that his factual 
conclusions in Adkins, though they contradicted those of the D.C. legislature, were so clearly correct 
that “the question of what the facts establish[ed]” was not a fairly debatable one.”177  
Turning, at last, to West Coast Hotel – the case that finally overruled Lochner, Adkins, and the 
liberty-of-contract legal regime – it is no surprise that Hughes’ majority opinion in West Coast Hotel 
strongly endorses the principle of judicial deference.  West Coast Hotel cites O’Gorman & Young v. 
Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,178 as supporting “the presumption of the constitutionality of a statute 
dealing with a subject within the scope of the police power,” and quotes Nebbia179 for the 
proposition “that ‘with the wisdom of the policy adopted, with the adequacy or practicability of the 
law enacted to forward it, the courts are both incompetent and unauthorized to deal’; that ‘times 
without number we have said that the legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of such an 
enactment, that every possible presumption is in favor of its validity, and that though the court may 
hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not be annulled unless palpably in excess 
of legislative power.’”180  This echo of Harlan’s principle of judicial deference follows Hughes’ earlier 
articulation of his interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, which he first stated in McGuire, 
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which conceives of “liberty” as “liberty in a social organization which requires the protection of law 
against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals and welfare of the people,” and holds, with 
respect to “due process” in relation to legislative restraints on liberty, that “regulation which is 
reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due 
process.”181  This very expansive conception of valid police powers legislation could not coexist with 
the rival conception articulated in the majority opinions in Lochner and Adkins.  Hughes had the 
votes, and the rest, as they say, is history.  
 
Section III. The Normative in the Descriptive 
A. Assessing Past Decisions 
According to Gillman, when we look back on this history, we should see Hughes’ opinion as 
stating an obvious falsehood, namely, the claim that Adkins had been “a departure.”  Gillman replies 
that “[t]his, of course, was not so.”182  Moreover, Gillman contends that Hughes disingenuously 
“claim[ed] that he was merely correcting a mistake” but was, in fact, “jettisoning a constitutional 
tradition that was a century and a half old” (Ibid.).  What are we to make of this?  First, Gillman’s 
characterization of Hughes’ West Coast Hotel opinion seems unwarranted and unfair.  The above 
discussion of cases that seem to support Hughes’ opinion is very brief, but it demonstrates that 
Hughes’ opinion was supported by a line of reasoning developed in a number of cases over decades.  
Moreover, brief though it is, my discussion of the legal reasoning advanced in West Coast Hotel is 
much more than we get from Gillman, who follows Justice Sutherland in wholly ignoring Hughes’ 
legal arguments and doesn’t even mention the McGuire holding.  The latter omission is especially 
culpable in a discussion of the legitimacy – or purported lack thereof – of an important opinion that 
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centrally relies on McGuire.  Indeed, based on McGuire alone, we can confidently assert, contra 
Gillman, that Hughes’ opinion in West Coast Hotel wasn’t obviously or completely without legal support 
because it largely reiterated the broad and permissive conception of valid police powers legislation 
set forth in Hughes’ unanimous opinion in McGuire more than 25 years before West Coast Hotel.               
  Furthermore, as I outlined above, we can trace the roots of this broad conception back to 
the Court’s opinions in Crowley (1890), Frisbie (1895), Gundling (1900), Jacobson (1905), McLean (1909), 
and of course, McGuire (1911); and onward through Radice (1924), O’Gorman (1931), and – perhaps 
most importantly183 – Nebbia (1934), before Hughes established its dominance in West Coast Hotel 
(1937).184  In addition, important arguments in support of this conception appear in Harlan’s Lochner 
dissent and Taft’s Adkins dissent.  And the aforementioned are just the cases I could include in a 
brief discussion; a more complete exploration of the available support for West Coast Hotel would 
surely consider the many additional cases Hughes cites in West Coast Hotel and McGuire.  But the brief 
discussion I’ve provided herein permits me to reject Gillman’s uncharitable suggestion that Hughes’ 
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claimed justification for his West Coast Hotel opinion was a mere rationalization fabricated out of 
whole cloth.   
 
B. A Harmless Digression Concerning Legal Realism 
The Supreme Court’s majority185 opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey offers the following 
assessment of the majority opinion in West Coast Hotel: 
West Coast Hotel and Brown each rested on facts, or an understanding of facts, changed from 
those which furnished the claimed justifications for the earlier constitutional resolutions. 
Each case was comprehensible as the Court’s response to facts that the country could 
understand, or had come to understand already, but which the Court of an earlier day, as its 
own declarations disclosed, had not been able to perceive. As the decisions were thus 
comprehensible they were also defensible, not merely as the victories of one doctrinal school 
over another by dint of numbers (victories though they were), but as applications of 
constitutional principle to facts as they had not been seen by the Court before. In 
constitutional adjudication as elsewhere in life, changed circumstances may impose new 
obligations, and the thoughtful part of the Nation could accept each decision to overrule a 
prior case as a response to the Court’s constitutional duty.186 
 
I offer this passage not as an authoritative interpretation of West Coast Hotel, but as one that a 
majority of the sitting Supreme Court Justices in 1992 considered sufficiently sensible to endorse.  In 
particular, notice the Court’s claim that West Coast Hotel could be accepted “as a response to the 
Court’s constitutional duty.”  Perhaps the Court means to imply that the West Coast Hotel opinion 
was the response, i.e., the correct one, but we can just as plausibly read the passage as suggesting that 
it was a reasonable response to the Court’s perceived constitutional duty.   
In any case, the Casey majority did not need to say that the Four Horsemen’s dissenting 
interpretation of their constitutional duty was unreasonable in order to say that the West Coast Hotel 
majority’s interpretation was reasonable.  Instead, it is possible to state without contradiction that each 
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of two (or more) sharply differing interpretations of “what the law requires” in a given case is 
sufficiently reasonable for one or more sensible Justices sincerely to endorse it.  This sort of 
“pluralism” about plausible legal interpretations seems to be a standard move in response to the 
attitudinal model,187 and as I tried to show in the preceding section, if all we aim to do is show that 
sensible Justices could have sincerely endorsed the interpretation of contemporary constitutional law 
expressed in the West Coast Hotel majority opinion, Lochner-era legal materials provide ample support.  
This, in turn, supports the Casey majority’s assessment of West Coast Hotel and casts doubt on 
Gillman’s attitudinal account.   
Defenders of the standard Legal Realist model might respond that my defense of West Coast 
Hotel – since it relies on showing that the majority’s decision-making was both rule-governed and 
consistent with a plausible interpretation of existing legal materials – only rules out the possibility 
that the Justices in question were blatant policy-seekers who didn’t even pretend to engage in 
principled decision-making. Since nobody holds that judicial decision-making is only constrained by 
unadorned policy-seeking, why not conclude that the West Coast Hotel majority had merely tacitly 
agreed to conform to institutional or professional norms while simultaneously seeking to influence 
policy as much as possible? If all agree that the apparently rule-governed character of judicial 
decision-making is consistent with either the Legal Realist model or the legal model, simply pointing 
out this sort of mutual consistency doesn’t provide any obvious reason to accept one model over the 
other.    
However, this reasoning cuts both ways, and I contend that advocates of the Legal Realist 
model must meet a higher burden of proof than those of the legal model. This is because Legal 
Realists seek to advance an alternative explanation for the causes of judicial decision-making in order 
to supplant the established and prima facie plausible explanation. To illustrate, suppose a layperson 
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asked one how judges decide cases. One might include some caveats, but the straightforward 
response is that judges apparently examine questions of law and relevant legal materials and then seek 
to discover and articulate what the law requires. This explanation may be false, but we can say in its 
favor that it describes what judges are expected – perhaps required – to do, what they typically claim 
to be doing, and what citizens subject to the courts over which they preside presumably want them 
to do.   
Where such “default” explanations exist, those who seek to supplant them arguably take on 
a heightened burden of proof. Accordingly, I assert that the straightforward “legal” explanation of 
judicial decision-making does not have the same epistemic status as other explanations consistent 
with the relevant data. Instead, proponents of competing explanations must bear the burden of 
proving that they are more plausible than the received explanation, which we consider plausible for 
several reasons, e.g., judges tell us they seek to interpret the law in good faith, we expect them to do 
so, and the “legal” model is arguably the appropriate basis for any straightforward explanation of 
what judges do.  
Moreover, one of my chief objections to Gillman’s attitudinal account of West Coast Hotel 
concerns his implication that Justice Hughes and the other Justices who joined his majority opinion 
were self-conscious “policy-seekers.” My opposition to this unnecessarily ambitious claim does not 
preclude my endorsing the insight in J. L. Mackie’s observation that “what judges say they are doing, 
what they think they are doing, and the most accurate objective description of what they actually are 
doing”188 may frequently diverge. For example, I do not wish to deny that some or all judicial 
decision-making might be unconsciously driven by policy-seeking. Indeed, I am sympathetic to several 
                                                          
188 J. L. Mackie, The Third Theory of Law, 7 PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 3 (1977) at 7.  Indeed, Mackie is one of 
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aspects of the Legal Realist project, not least its emphasis on the importance of examining and 
increasing awareness of the influence of extralegal factors on legal outcomes. Nonetheless, I think 
we should resist the common Legal Realist stratagem of asserting that the undeniable existence of 
ambiguity in the law automatically pushes us toward a presumption that extra-legal factors are 
dominant in judicial decision-making, both because this presumption simply does not follow from 
legal ambiguity and because there are commonsense reasons, as I outline above, to think that many 
judges either do or take themselves to be doing what judges are supposed to do, i.e., interpret and 
articulate what the law requires.    
        
 Section IV: Abandoning Neutrality 
Thus far, most of my discussion has been relatively neutral about which of the two 
competing strands of Lochner-era ideology I describe above had the greater claim to legitimacy, in 
part because I wished to parse out the thorny question of what existing constitutional law required 
in the early 20th Century. However, I will now turn to a largely normative – though partly legal – 
argument in favor of the West Coast Hotel Court’s rejection of the liberty-of-contract legal regime 
upheld in Lochner and Adkins.   
I conceded at the outset of this Chapter that the ideology endorsed by the Lochner majority 
and like-minded Justices had a claim to plausibility as a principled interpretation of contemporary 
Constitutional law, but I have also argued at length for the conclusion that the competing strand of 
ideology endorsed by Justice Hughes and the other Justices who joined his majority opinion in West 
Coast Hotel is similarly plausible. Now, for the sake of argument, let us assume that at least with 
respect to the question of legal and Constitutional interpretation, these two competing ideologies 
had roughly equal claims to plausibility. Even granting this further concession, it is clear that the 
liberty-of-contract view was normatively inferior to the broad-police-powers view which supplanted 
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it because it was based on a popular but deleterious fantasy. This fantasy concerns men and their 
amazing powers of strength, rationality, will, and temperance. It is both sexist and psychologically 
unrealistic but has been remarkably prominent and influential throughout recorded history. The 
fantasy, in its simplest form, is roughly as follows: Men are independent and don’t need or deserve 
anyone else’s help.  
 How is this familiar but very general line of thought relevant to the present discussion of 
Lochner-era legal ideologies? If the fantasy in question were the closely-related but gender-neutral 
version, such that humans have these amazing powers and are therefore independent – and this 
version has undoubtedly become more oft-stated and -endorsed than the gender-specific one over 
the last several decades – its relevance would be less obvious but still worth considering. However, 
in the Lochner-era legal context, the gender-specific fantasy was far more influential, and it was 
important to the ideological struggle I have described because it allowed the liberty-of-contract 
regime to persist long after the facts on the ground showed that it richly deserved to be discarded. 
By way of explanation, recall that Gillman defends the Lochner majority Justices on the 
grounds “that the Justices were by and large motivated by a principled commitment to the 
application of a constitutional ideology of state neutrality, as manifested in the requirement that 
legislation advance a discernible public purpose.”189 This argument would strike many modern 
readers as bizarre because our current understanding of “public purpose” is so much different from 
that which was commonly held in the 19th Century. In short, we now accept and embrace that the 
“public” in whose interests the law may legitimately intervene includes adult males of sound mind and 
                                                          
189  HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED (1993) at 199. It may strike modern readers as bizarre for 
Lochner-era Justices to claim that protecting the health of bakers did not “advance a discernible public purpose,” but as I 
will discuss later in the paper, they made this claim against the backdrop assumption that freely contracting adult men 
were somehow independent from the “public,” such that designing legislation to assist or protect any of these free-agent 
parties would constitute offering them an unfair advantage rather than contributing to the common weal.    
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body. Obvious though this seems to us now, it was not so to many Lochner-era Justices, as 
contemporary jurist Roscoe Pound presciently explains: 
Legislation designed to give laborers some measure of practical independence, which, if 
allowed to operate, would put them in a position of reasonable equality with their masters, is 
said by courts, because it infringes on a theoretical equality, to be insulting to their manhood 
and degrading, to put them under guardianship, to create a class of statutory laborers, and to 
stamp them as imbeciles.190 
 
Legal opinions of the time abound with the sentiment Pound summarizes in the foregoing passage, 
and they make plain that the statute in Lochner – which prohibited contracts requiring bakers to work 
more than 10 hours per day – was held to advance no discernible “public” purpose because men are 
not to be helped by the law in the same ways that it may legitimately help the public. To help men in 
their struggle for advancement on a theoretically level playing field would not only “be insulting to 
their manhood and degrading,” but would also offend the notion of “state neutrality” by extending 
an unfair advantage – a “hand-out” – to some players while withholding it from others. As this 
rough metaphor suggests, on this “level playing field,” the men are the players and the public, though 
important in many ways, is largely regarded as a passive backdrop to the game at hand.  
To recapitulate, on this view, it would be insulting to bakers’ manhood and unfair to other 
active parties for the law to intervene in order to improve bakers’ bargaining positions in labor 
markets. Accordingly, from the Lochner Justices’ perspective, the law limiting bakers’ hours of work 
advanced no discernible public purpose because if the bakers didn’t like the terms of their 
employment, they should simply “man up”: quit, refuse the bargain in the first place, or quit whining 
and follow through on what they had agreed to do. According to the dominant view, men didn’t 
need to be – and ought not have been – helped or protected by the law in their competitive struggles 
with and against each other. 
                                                          
190  Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L. J. 454 (1909) (citing Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. St. 431, 437 
(1886); State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 186 (1889); Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Ill. 66, 74 (1893); State v. Haun, 
61 Kans. 146, 162 (1899); People v. Beck, 10 Misc. 77 (1894) (dissenting opinion of White, J.); Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 
171, 187 (1892)). 
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Women and children, on the other hand, were legitimate objects of help and protection, and 
therefore one of the main exceptions to the Lochner-era presumption against the constitutionality of 
work regulations concerned those which sought to improve the working conditions of persons who 
were not men: 
[T]he overwhelming weight of authority is to the effect that the legislature may regulate the 
hours and conditions of labor of women and children. Here it is said there are “natural” 
incapacities.191 
 
This trend, which Roscoe Pound observed in 1909, continued into the early 20th Century for several 
years. For example, in 1924, the Supreme Court upheld a statute prohibiting the employment of 
women to work at night in Radice v. New York, endorsing New York’s argument for an exception to 
the usual liberty-of-contract rule, as follows: 
The basis of the first contention is that the statute unduly and arbitrarily interferes with the 
liberty of two adult persons to make a contract of employment for themselves. The answer 
of the State is that night work of the kind prohibited, so injuriously affects the physical 
condition of women, and so threatens to impair their peculiar and natural functions, and so 
exposes them to the dangers and menaces incident to night life in large cities, that a statute 
prohibiting such work falls within the police power of the State to preserve and promote the 
public health and welfare.192 
 
Why is this exception neither insulting nor unfair to the women whom it purports to protect? The 
answer, of course, is that it cannot be insulting to their “manhood,” as they are mere women, and it 
is in no way unfair to provide this sort of help and protection to those who are burdened by 
“‘natural’ incapacities.”  
However, even by 1924, this line of reasoning was starting to unravel, as this quote from 
Adkins, which was decided in the same year as Radice, demonstrates: 
In addition to the cases cited above, there are the decisions of this Court dealing with laws 
especially relating to hours of labor for women: Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412; Riley v. 
                                                          
191  Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L. J. 454 (1909) (citing Con. v. Hamilton Mfg. Co. (1876), 120 Mass. 
383; Beyman v. Cleveland (1884), 39 Ohio St. 651; State v. Buchannan (1902), 29 Wash. 602; Wenham v. State (1902), 65 
Neb. 394; State v. Muller (1906), 48 Ore. 252; State v. Shorey (1906), 48 Ore. 396; Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412 
(1908); Starnes v. Allison Mfg. Co. (N. C. 1908), 61 S. E. 525). 
192  Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 294-95 (1924) (citing Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 395 (1898)). 
 
101 
 
Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373; Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385. 
In the Muller Case the validity of an Oregon statute, forbidding the employment of any 
female in certain industries more than ten hours during any one day was upheld. The 
decision proceeded upon the theory that the difference between the sexes may justify a 
different rule respecting hours of labor in the case of women than in the case of men. It is 
pointed out that these consist in differences of physical structure, especially in respect of the 
maternal functions, and also in the fact that historically woman has always been dependent 
upon man, who has established his control by superior physical strength. The cases of Riley, 
Miller and Bosley follow in this respect the Muller Case. But the ancient inequality of the sexes, 
otherwise than physical, as suggested in the Muller Case (p. 421) has continued “with 
diminishing intensity.” In view of the great — not to say revolutionary — changes which 
have taken place since that utterance, in the contractual, political and civil status of women, 
culminating in the Nineteenth Amendment, it is not unreasonable to say that these 
differences have now come almost, if not quite, to the vanishing point. In this aspect of the 
matter, while the physical differences must be recognized in appropriate cases, and 
legislation fixing hours or conditions of work may properly take them into account, we 
cannot accept the doctrine that women of mature age, sui juris, require or may be subjected 
to restrictions upon their liberty of contract which could not lawfully be imposed in the case 
of men under similar circumstances. To do so would be to ignore all the implications to be 
drawn from the present day trend of legislation, as well as that of common thought and 
usage, by which woman is accorded emancipation from the old doctrine that she must be 
given special protection or be subjected to special restraint in her contractual and civil 
relationships. In passing, it may be noted that the instant statute applies in the case of a 
woman employer contracting with a woman employee as it does when the former is a 
man.193 
 
And that, in a nutshell, is why the liberty-of-contract era had to be abandoned. Faced with the 
unavoidable truth that women were becoming “players” – who could at that time “theoretically” be 
viewed as “on equal footing” with men about as plausibly as poor men could be held to be the 
equals of rich men and corporations – the Court had only two choices: either extend protective 
legislation to working men or take it away from women. At least one state court took the latter 
route,194 but with the advent of the Great Depression, it was increasingly difficult to sustain the 
fantasy about men’s powers and independence that made the liberty-of-contract appear tenable to 
19th-Century sensibilities. After 1929, it became abundantly clear that men – despite their most 
                                                          
193  Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
 
194  Richie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 99 (1895). 
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cherished and perennial fantasies about themselves – needed help and protection of the sort that 
had hitherto been extended only to women, children, and others with “natural incapacities.”   
The Great Depression exposed men for the “weaklings” they are: vulnerable to hunger, 
thirst, exhaustion, and sickness; often susceptible to poor judgment, weakness of will, and loss of 
nerve; and above all needy and dependent upon others. The old fantasy about men didn’t disappear, 
of course, and it can be readily revived and enjoyed with a viewing of just about any 21st-Century 
“blockbuster” movie, but at least for a time in the 1920s and 30s, the “arms-length,” “lone wolf,” 
“free to choose his own terms” nonsense that animated the liberty-of-contract legal regime stopped 
making sense. The Lochner majority and like-minded Justices doggedly held the line for as long as 
they could, but their inflated understandings of the capacities and powers of men – or humans, for 
that matter – were simply wrong. Justice Hughes and his compatriots overruled the Lochner ideology 
in West Coast Hotel in 1937, and quite rightly, the law has never looked back.  
 
 
 
 Section V: Concluding Remarks 
I opened this Chapter by suggesting that Gillman offers an “attitudinal” account of West 
Coast Hotel, and I think that I have provided some grounds for doing so, given his characterization 
of Justice Hughes’ opinion in that case.  But whether or not his account is “attitudinal,” it is 
dismissively critical of the West Coast Hotel majority opinion, and in Section II, I explored what might 
be offered in the opinion’s defense.  My discussion of the legal materials that arguably provide 
support for Justice Hughes’ reasoning is brief, but it is sufficient for my purposes in that Section, i.e., 
to show that the broad conception of valid police powers legislation and what I have called the 
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principle of “judicial deference” expressed in West Coast Hotel was firmly grounded in existing legal 
materials.   
In Section III, I discussed the seeming tension between Gillman’s recognition that “neither 
doctrinal formulations nor legal texts possess a singular, objective, determinable meaning,”195 and his 
confident assertion that what Hughes claimed about the law “of course, was not so.”196 This seems 
to imply that the relevant legal texts did, in fact, possess an objective meaning but that Justice 
Hughes had somehow gotten it wrong.  Perhaps Gillman didn’t mean to say anything so “ambitiously 
normative,” but in any case, I show that the substantial support in contemporary legal materials for 
the ideology expressed in the West Coast Hotel majority opinion makes clear that Gillman’s dismissive 
characterization of the opinion’s reasoning cannot be accurate.  
 Finally, in Section IV, I turned to a normative argument in favor of the West Coast Hotel 
decision and the new legal regime it ushered in to replace the Lochner-era liberty-of-contract regime. I 
argue, in essence, that the extreme liberty-of-contract view is based on a perennially appealing but 
deleterious fantasy to the effect that men are or ought to be so capable and independent that they 
should be seen as somehow separate from the “public.” According to this view, although the health, 
safety, morals, and welfare of the “public” could be legitimate objects of legislative protection, it 
would be both degrading to individual men and unfair to their competitors to extend similar 
protection – with its implications of weakness and dependence upon others – to men.  
Of course, this fantasy and the view it nurtured during the Lochner era were simply mistaken, 
and this became incontrovertibly clear with the advent of the Great Depression. The extreme 
liberty-of-contract view was both objectionably sexist and based on a dangerously unrealistic 
conception of what men – or perhaps only the “real” ones – could and should be. Therefore, its 
                                                          
195  HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED (1993) at 16. 
 
196  Id. at 191. 
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realization in constitutional law should never have been pursued so enthusiastically. Once it became 
possible to “jettison” that tradition – in Gillman’s phrase – doing so was not only a reasonable 
interpretation of existing legal materials but also the only defensible move for the Court to make in 
response to its earlier missteps.     
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
  
In closing, I will briefly describe some of the further research suggested by the investigations 
I pursued in this dissertation. Each chapter had a distinct subject, but they all shared an emphasis on 
exploring what is important – beyond contracts of employment, which I believe are overemphasized 
in most discourse on this topic – about work law and work relationships. 
First, I believe that Chapter Two, in which I argue that a just society owes more to its 
workers than exit options, suggests an exploration of what work law could contribute to improve 
the lot of workers. One concrete intervention for which I will argue in future research is the 
elimination or substantial revision of the longstanding rule of “at-will” employment, which provides 
by default that absent explicit agreement to the contrary, any party to a work relationship may 
terminate it at any time, for any reason – except provable discrimination, illegal retaliation, or other 
specific prohibited grounds – and without notice. Criticizing the “at-will” rule is not novel, but my 
focus on status, governance, and authority in work relationships offers a new lens through which to 
view the issue.  For example, if we compare work with other important personal relationships, we 
could ask why we tolerate “at-will” employment but would reject “at-will” marriage, parenthood, or 
guardianship relationships. More pointedly, I will argue that if, as I contend, work law should only 
allow justifiable exercises of authority in work relationships, we cannot realistically expect to achieve 
this goal while allowing the “at-will” rule to persist. Having the ability to fire employees at will 
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simply places too much power in the hands of employers, permitting them to become petty tyrants 
in the workplaces they govern. I will conclude that no just system of work law should permit this. 
Second, I argue in Chapter Three that it would best serve our normative and descriptive 
purposes to view work law as creating and regulating role-based authority relationships, but I leave 
important questions concerning the nature and extent of justifiable authority unanswered. I will 
address these questions in a further paper by sketching an approach to identifying legitimate and 
illegitimate exercises of authority by “masters” over “servants” in work relationships. I will employ 
“role-based” views of authority relationships to argue that such relationships derive their legitimacy, 
if any, from their nature and from the benefits they confer and burdens they impose. Accordingly, I 
will argue that authority is only legitimately exercised in work relationships to the extent that it is at 
least implicitly consented to by – and serves at least some important needs of – all affected parties. 
Furthermore, I will argue that by permitting at-will firing of employees and in other ways, the law 
grants employers the power to demand broad, status-based deferential treatment rather than mere 
compliance with work-related orders. In contrast, state or legal authorities should properly expect no 
more than compliance. As Scott Hershovitz notes, citizens who sullenly or grudgingly conform to 
the law’s requirements are not subject to being “reprimanded for insolence” like children. Similarly, 
work law should deny employers the ability to demand the “bowing and scraping” to which Michael 
Walzer famously objects while permitting no more authority than is necessary to run an efficient and 
stable workplace.  
Third, Chapter Four is devoted to critiquing Howard Gillman’s mischaracterization of the 
West Coast Hotel majority opinion and offering a defense of its legal and normative legitimacy. I 
believe this offers further support for the importance of using state regulation to protect workers 
and improve the nature of work relationships, but what form should such further regulation take? I 
will answer this question by articulating and expanding the rights and obligations that work law does 
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and/or should impose upon parties to work relationships as necessary incidents to occupying either 
of the roles – i.e., accepting the status of “master” or “servant” – that are constitutive of such 
relationships.  Focusing primarily on the interests of workers, I advocate the explicit adoption of a 
workers’ “bill of rights” which responds to and seeks to eliminate many of the worst abuses to 
which employees are often subjected.  For example, current U.S. work law permits employers to fire 
their employees for, e.g., bumper stickers the employer dislikes, drinking beer after work, or 
attending a rally for a political candidate.  It should not be thus, and we cannot rely on the hope that 
employers will choose to be decent without legal intervention.  On the other hand, I will also argue 
that employers should have some basis in work law for expecting and demanding minimum 
standards of loyalty and good-faith investment in the success of their enterprises from their 
employees.  
   
